
2010 IEEE Aerospace Conference

Big Sky, MT, March 11, 2010

Session#: 7.04 Reconfigurable Computing System Technologies


Pres #: 7.0401, Paper ID: 1079

Rm: Elbow 2, Time: 4:30pm

Spatial Avoidance of Hardware Faults using FPGA Partial Reconfiguration of Tile-Based Soft Processors

Authors: Clint Gauer, Brock J. LaMeres & David Racek
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Montana State University

Presenter: Brock J. LaMeres



Acknowledgements

- This work was supported by:



Montana Space Grant Consortium
(NASA EPSCoR)
<http://spacegrant.montana.edu>



NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate
“*Higher Education Program*”
<http://education.ksc.nasa.gov/esmdspacegrant/>

- Special thanks to our project mentors from NASA’s
Advanced Avionics & Processor Systems (AAPS) Project

Dr. Robert E. Ray
Marshall Space Flight Center
Reconfigurable Computing Task



Dr. Andrew S. Keys
Marshall Space Flight Center
AAPS Project Manager

Dr. Michael A. Johnson
Goddard Space Flight Center
High Performance Processor Task



Motivation

- Radiation has a detrimental effect on electronics in space environments.
- The root cause is from electron/hole pairs creation as the radiation strikes the semiconductor portion of the device and ionizes the material.



Types

- *alpha particles* (Terrestrial, from packaging/doping)
- *Neutrons* (Terrestrial, secondary effect from Galactic Cosmic Rays entering atmosphere)
- *Heavy ions* (Aerospace, direct ionization)
- *Proton* (Aerospace, secondary effect)



Motivation

- Two types of failures mechanics are induced by radiation

1) Total Ionizing Dose (TID)

- The cumulative, long term ionizing damage to the device materials
- Caused by low energy protons & electrons

2) Single Event Effects (SEE)

- Transient spikes caused by Heavy Ions and protons
- Can be both destructive & non-destructive




Motivation (TID)

1) Total Ionizing Dose (TID)

- As the electron/holes try to recombine, they experience different mobility rates ($\mu_n > \mu_p$)
- Over time, the ionized particles can get trapped in the oxide or substrate of the device prior to recombination
- This can lead to:


- Threshold Shifting
- Leakage Current
- Timing Skew



Motivation (SEEs)

2) Single Event Effects (SEEs)

- Transient voltage/current induced in devices
- This can lead to both Non-Destructive and Destructive effects



Non-Destructive

Single Event Transient (SET)

Single Event Upset (SEU)

Single Event Func. Interrupt (SEFI)

Multi-Bit Upsets (MBU)

Behavior

A transient spike of voltage/current noise, can cause gate switching

A transient captured in a storage device (FF/RAM) as a state change

A fault that cannot be recovered from using a reset.

Multiple, simultaneous SEUs

Destructive

Single Event Latchup (SEL)

Single Event Burnout (SEB)

Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR)

Behavior

Transient biases the parasitic bipolar SCR in CMOS causing latchup

Transient causes the device to draw high current which damages part

The energy is enough to damage the gate oxide



Mitigation of TIDs

1) Current Mitigation Techniques (TID)


- Parts can be “hardened” to TID through:
 - layout techniques (sizing of Q_{crit} , enclosed layout)
 - guard rings
 - substrate doping
 - redundant circuitry
- Parts are specified in terms of:
 - “the amount of energy that can be tolerated by ionizing particles before the part performance is out of spec”
 - units are given in krad (Si), typically 300krad+
- Shielding Does Help
 - low energy protons/electrons can be stopped at the expense of weight



Mitigation of SEEs

2) Current Mitigation Techniques (SEEs)

- Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)



- Reboot/Recovery Sequences

- Shielding Does NOT eliminate all SEEs


- impractical to shield against high energy particles and Heavy Ions due to necessary mass



Drawback of Mitigation

- **Radiation Hardening = Slower Performance**

- All TID mitigation techniques lead to slower performance




- TID mitigation **DOES NOT** prevent SEEs



FPGAs & Radiation

- **Radiation Mitigation in FPGAs**

- RAM based FPGAs are traditionally *soft* to radiation
- Fuse-based FPGAs provide some hardness, but give up the flexibility of real-time programmability





- **Exploiting Reconfiguration**

- The flexibility of FPGAs enables novel techniques to radiation tolerant computing
 - ex) Dynamic TMR, Spatial Avoidance of TID failures,*
- The flexibility of FPGAs is attractive to weight constrained Aerospace applications
 - ex) Reduction of flight spares, internal spare circuitry*



FPGAs as a Solution?

- Field Programmable Gate Arrays



- FPGAs have followed Moore's Law and now yield comparable processing power to ASICs




Many-Core Architecture

- **Radiation Tolerance Through Architecture**


- Redundant, Homogenous, Soft Processors

- At Any Given Time, 3 are configured in *Triple Modular Redundancy* (TMR)



Many-Core Architecture

- **Types of Radiation Faults Seen in FPGAs**



1) Soft (SEU, SET)

- SEUs that can be recovered from using a reset

2) Medium (SEFI)

- SEUs in reconfiguration memory, can only be recovered using reconfiguration

3) Hard (TID / Displacement Damage)

- Damage to part of the chip due to TID or Displacement Damage



Many-Core Architecture

- Fault Recovery Procedures

Fault Type

Recovery Action

Soft Faults


- TMR Voter detects fault
- 2 good processors complete current task
- Good 2 processors offload variable data
- All 3 processors are reset
- All 3 processors re-initialized with variable data
- All 3 processors resume operation in TMR

Medium Faults

- Same general procedure, *except*
Bad processors is **partially reconfigured**
to reset configuration RAM

Hard Faults



- A spare processor is brought online to complete TMR
- Bad processor is flagged as “DO NOT USE”



Many-Core Architecture

- Advantages of this Approach


- 1) SEUs mitigated using traditional TMR
- 2) Partial Reconfiguration technique increases *hardness* of RAM-based FPGAs
- 3) Spatial avoidance of damaged regions of FPGA extend system lifetime
- 4) Logical approach can be applied to RHBD FPGA fabrics (*SIRF*, etc...) for increased radiation immunity



System Prototyping

- **Many-Core Computing Architecture**


- 16 picoBlaze Processors (3+13) implement on a Virtex-5 LX50
- The computer system controls basic peripherals
- A push button is used to mimic soft SEUs
- A PC GUI is created to inject hard failures
- HyperTerminal is used to mimic medium severity faults requiring partial reconfiguration
- Xilinx ChipScope used to monitor processor operation on all 16 processors



System Demonstration

- **Normal Operation**

- Processors **0, 1, and 2** are active (blue) and operating in TMR
- Processors **3-13** provide spare *picoBlaze* processors (gray)



↑
GUI indicates uP 0, 1, and 2 are active (blue)

↑
ChipScope shows uP 1,2,3 are running in synch with no faults


(showing address lines between uP and memory for all 16 processors)



System Demonstration

- **Soft Fault Recovery**


- Processors **0, 1, and 2** are active (blue) operating in TMR
- Processor **0** undergoes a soft fault and then recovers and resynchronizes



System Demonstration

- **Hard Fault Recovery**


- Processors 2 undergoes hard fault (induced by GUI, **red**)
- The system shuts down uP #2 and brings on spare processor uP #3 into TMR



System Demonstration

- **Multiple Hard Faults**

- Multiple hard faults are present
- uPs 3, 5, and 8 form TMR



Timing/Area Impact

- **Soft Fault Recovery** (reset, reload variable information)

Timing Overhead

- TMR interrupt	2 clocks	
- Reset	2 clocks	
- Read variable data from good processors:	128 clocks	(2 clks/inst, 64 bytes of RAM)
- Write variable data to reset processor:	128 clocks	(2 clks/inst, 64 bytes of RAM)
<hr/>		
Total	260 clocks = 2.6 us	(100 MHz V5 Clock)




System Demonstration

- **Medium Severity Fault Recovery (SEFI)**

- An initial hard failure can be *repaired* by going back to the effected processor and reconfiguring it.
- This handles the situation where an SEU occurred in the configuration RAM
- For this type of fault, a simple reset will not recover the processor


BUT

the processor hardware is still usable.




System Demonstration

- **Medium Severity Fault Recovery (SEFI on uP #0)**
 - Repairing Processor 0 using Partial Reconfiguration




System Demonstration

- **Medium Severity Fault Recovery (SEFI on uP #1)**
 - Repairing Processor 1 using Partial Reconfiguration



Partial Reconfiguration Constraints

- For our V5, the smallest quantum that can be partially reconfigured is 20 CLB's
 - 1 CLB contains: *2 Slices*
 - 1 Slice contains: *- four LUTs*
- four storage elements
- wide-function multiplexers
- carry logic
- If you use BRAM in your design, 4 BRAMs must be partially reconfigured together
- Care must be given to placing circuitry within the smallest partially reconfigured tile
- Bus Macros are used to provide fixed routing channels between tiles.



PR of a *picoBlaze* Core

Physical *picoBlaze* resource estimation:

Site Type	Available	Required	% Util
LUT	320	163	50.94
FF	320	76	23.75
SLICEL	60	35	58.33
SLICEM	20	12	60.00
RAMBFIFO36	4	1	25.00

- 24 CLBs, 1 BRAM

PR region resource use:

- 2 columns of 20 CLBs
- 1 column of BRAM


Smallest *picoBlaze* PR Tile
=
40 CLB + 4BRAM

Bitstream file size(LX50T):

- Partial bitstream for one PicoBlaze: 31.2 KB
- Full bitstream: 1,716 KB

Reconfiguration time:

- Roughly 200 clks/Byte (measured)
- Measured time: **66ms** (100 MHz clk)
- Using MicroBlaze driven ICAP processor



A single PicoBlaze PR region





Questions

