

The Financial Crisis

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November 2009

Discussion Outline

- I. Situation Prior to 2006
- II. Situation Changes
- III. Crisis Issues
- IV. Government Intervention Considerations

I. Situation Prior to 2006

- House prices had increased for many years
- Home ownership had become a national priority and so regulatory agencies became lenient
- Lenders were confident that house prices would continue to rise and so were less vigilant in their lending practices
- Subprime loans became prevalent

I. Situation Prior to 2006

- Subprime loans
 - Low, no, or negative down payment
(25 years ago often required 20% down)
 - Back loaded payment schemes
 - Less emphasis on cash flow including documenting repayment capacity
 - Less rigorous credit checks
- Government policies, including direct subsidies reduced house mortgage interest rate

I. Situation Prior to 2006

- “Flip that house” rather than eventual payoff became more prevalent
 - Purchasing and reselling houses or refinancing to extract equity
 - Does not result in high equity accumulation
- Demand for housing expanded, driving up the price of houses


I. Situation Prior to 2006

- Low equity houses are more vulnerable to declining house prices
- Public policy pressured lenders to increase homeownership
 - “American Dream”
 - Redlining

II. Situation Changed


- Interest rates modestly increased
- Unemployment modestly increased
- House market became more saturated
- Savings rate low

Personal Savings (BEA)



II. Situation Changed

Home Ownership



Bureau of the Census, CPS, Series H-111

II. Situation Changed

- Down Payment

- 1989

- ✓ Average down payment – 20%
- ✓ Almost no loans without down payment

- 2008

- ✓ Average down payment – 9%
- ✓ 29% no down payment

II. Situation Changed


- House payments became more difficult
- Therefore more houses came on the market
- As the number of houses on the market increased, home prices were driven down resulting in less equity in houses
- House building continued because of lengthy and expensive subdivision approval process further driving house prices down
- “Walk Away”: Some home owners “walked away” from houses because they were “upside down” even though they had repayment capacity

II. Situation Changed

- Lower equity encouraged more defaults and even more houses came onto the market
- House prices spiraled downward and defaults increased making lenders susceptible to the subprime market and ultimately led to many failures
- However corporate financial assets remain relatively high
- The financial assets are not distributed evenly across all corporations

II. Situation Changed


Total Financial Assets (Trillions of 2008\$)



III. Crisis Issues

- Home prices (Nationwide)
 - Home prices have declined by over 30% in the last 2 years
 - Historical annual home price appreciation after inflation
 - ✓ 1890 to 2007 0.4%
 - ✓ 1960 to 2000 0.2%
 - ✓ 2000 to 1/1/06 11.2%
 - ✓ 1/1/06 to Present -30.0%

Case-Shiller 10 City House Price Index



Latest data: August, 2009

Case-Shiller & BLS

III. Crisis Issues

- Foreclosure and Serious Delinquency

| | <u>All Loans</u> | <u>Subprime Loans</u> |
|---------------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| In Foreclosure | 3.30% | 13.71% |
| Serious Delinquency | 3.74% | 23.11% |

- Subprime loans equals about 13% of all loans.

III. Crisis Issues

- States with Highest Foreclosures and Serious Delinquencies
 - California
 - Florida
 - Nevada
 - Arizona
 - Michigan

III. Crisis Issues

Definitions

- Secondary Mortgage Market
 - Market for a bundle of primary mortgages
 - Usually mortgages with similar risk bundled together
- Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO) - A type of mortgage-backed security that creates separate pools of pass-through rates for different classes of bondholders with varying maturities
- Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO), Mortgaged Backed Securities (MBS), Credit Default Swaps (CDS), and a variety of other perturbations are based on payment performance of a collection of mortgages

III. Crisis Issues

- These securities will be termed “secondary mortgage securities” (SMS)
- “SMS” are often sold to multiple buyers
- Holders of secondary mortgage securities may have two types of financial relationships (simplification)
 - Co-mortgages or vertical slice: each payment is shared proportionate to ownership
 - Tranched, layered, stacked, or horizontal slice: payments are distributed in a hierarchical manner (i.e., one security owner is paid off prior to the next owner)

III. Crisis Issues

Example situation

- A primary bank bundles one hundred million dollars of subprime mortgages into a secondary mortgage security (originally 100% of houses value)
- Firms A, B, C buy the secondary mortgage security with Firm A buying 20%, Firm B buying 30%, and Firm C buying 50%
- Firm A is the leading secondary mortgager
- Houses backing the secondary mortgage security decline in value 25%

III. Crisis Issues

Co-mortgage Example (all paid proportionately)

Firm A Balance Sheet

| | <u>Initial</u> | <u>Now</u> |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| <u>Assets</u> | | |
| Secondary Mortgage Security | \$20 mil | \$15 mil |
| <u>Liabilities</u> | | |
| Bonds Payable | <u>\$15 mil</u> | <u>\$15 mil</u> |
| <u>Equity</u> | | |
| | \$5 mil | \$ 0 |

III. Crisis Issues

Secondary Mortgage Security: Tranched, layered, or stacked,

- Firm A is the lead firm
 - Responsible for managing the security
 - Last firm to get paid (junior creditor)
 - Highest risk, highest contractual interest rate
- Firm C is the first to get paid and has the lowest contractual interest rate (most senior creditor)
- Firm B is the second to get paid and has an intermediate contractual interest rate (least senior creditor)

III. Crisis Issues

Layered, Stacked, or Tranched Mortgages Example

Firm A Balance Sheet

| | <u>Initial</u> | <u>Now</u> |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| <u>Assets</u> | | |
| Secondary Mortgage Security | \$20 mil | \$0 |
| <u>Liabilities</u> | | |
| Bonds Payable | <u>\$15 mil</u> | <u>\$15 mil</u> |
| <u>Equity</u> | \$5 mil | \$-15 mil |

III. Crisis Issues

Firm Description

- Firm A – High Risk
 - Hedge funds
 - Investment banks
 - Some holding companies
 - Some retirement funds
 - Some primary lenders
- Firm B & C – Low Risk
 - Insurance companies
 - Most retirement funds
 - Other risk averse large investors
- Montana banks appear to have purchased few SMS

III. Crisis Issues

- Mortgage management and collateral capture
 - The fragmented nature of the ownership of the mortgages reduces individual investor incentive to recover the value of the collateral
 - No individual holder of the security has a large enough claim on the asset to offset recovery costs
 - Simply tracing ownership of the mortgage has high transaction costs

III. Crisis Issues

- The secondary mortgage security may decline much more than the decline in value of the assets (for fully mortgaged home loans) because of
 - Collection costs
 - Transaction costs associated with nonfunctional other entities in the spider web of secondary mortgage security ownership

IV. Government Intervention Considerations

- Liquidity
- Who will bear the loss
 - Home owner
 - Savings and retirement funds
 - Financial institutions
 - Government/tax payers
- Principal agent problem - CEOs

IV. Government Intervention Considerations

- Limit spreading of financial difficulties
- Transaction costs
- Incentives
 - Future lending practices
 - Private sale and reorganization

IV. Government Intervention Considerations

- Own home policy placed unfair pressure on lenders
- How to intervene with banks
 - Buy stock
 - Loans
 - Buy mortgage securities
 - ✓ Market value
 - ✓ Face value
 - “Filling the hole”

IV. Government Intervention Considerations

- Coerced merger of financial institutions
- Financial institution bankruptcy approach
 - ✓ Debt for equity swap
 - ✓ Debt cram down
 - No compensation
 - Partial compensation
 - Total compensation

IV. Government Intervention Considerations

- SMS management must become effective which may require reconstitution of ownership into a single or limited number of owners to manage
 - Home foreclosures
 - Renegotiate debt and/or loan terms
 - Usual transactions
- 7.3 Million homeowners default 2008-10
- 4.3 Million lose homes
- Housing stock, 128 million houses