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MORAL VISIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

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Researchers and theorists in the field of developmental psychology surely have unearthed a number of interesting and helpful findings and perspectives on the unfolding of a human life. However, this field seems to be hampered by many of the unexamined and perhaps faulty assumptions that have been discussed throughout this book. One symptom or sign of this problem is the fact that research and theory in this subdiscipline, like much of psychology, are greatly fragmented such that no cohesive and compelling perspective on human development has yet emerged. Another serious shortcoming of the field is that it has yet to become fully aware of its own cultural roots and develop an orientation that speaks to all cultural traditions.

Much of developmental psychology is centered around research programs consisting of lots of small studies of very circumscribed phenomena analyzed in the languages of diverse theoretical frameworks that do not mesh very well with one another. The common assumption within psychology has been that “Major issues such as moral development must be reduced to researchable pieces” (Eisenberg, 1996, p. 58). However, increasingly we have come to realize that findings from such small pieces of research do not by themselves add up to a convincing or useful understanding of human phe-

nomena. (I recall a graduate school colleague of mine who had transferred from developmental psychology to another area of the field once remarked that she left partly because she was “afraid she would spend her entire academic career studying ‘looking responses’ in 4 year olds!”) Particular findings only take on meaning in the light of some wider theory of human action or personality in much the way that most paragraphs in a novel only take on meaning in the light of the novel’s story as a whole. Unfortunately, even when findings are linked to theory, we have to deal with the fact that different researchers and schools of thought, such as Piagetian thought, psychodynamic theory, learning theory, and a host of others, hold to different theoretical commitments that speak in different, often incommensurable terms about human behavior. A kind of relativism pervades psychology in which different schools of thought are recognized and tolerated but rarely challenged. Consequently, within developmental psychology, as in most other areas of psychology, schools, theories, models, and research traditions coexist in an uneasy truce, with surprisingly little engagement and cross-fertilization among them. This situation can be frustrating and discouraging to the thoughtful student and casts a shadow of doubt over the entire field.

The other main problem developmental psychology faces is that it has yet to effectively deal with the nature of culture and the fact that humans are deeply cultural beings (Cole, 1996; Jahoda, 1986, 2000; Valsiner & Lawrence, 1997). For example, Jerome Bruner (1990) argued that the tremendously influential “cognitive revolution” in psychology over the last half century has misfired in many ways because it views human life through the overly narrow lens of what is conventionally called *information processing*. By focusing on information rather than the richer phenomenon of cultural meaning, psychology, according to Bruner, precludes asking such questions as “How is the world organized in the mind of a Muslim fundamentalist?” or “How does the concept of Self differ in Homeric Greece and in the postindustrial world?” (p. 5). In Bruner’s view, human behavior consists most basically of *acts of meaning*. Thus, human beings

do not terminate at their own skins; they are expressions of culture. To treat the world as an indifferent flow of information to be processed by individuals each on his or her own terms is to lose sight of how individuals are formed and how they function. . . . Given that psychology is so immersed in culture, it must be organized around those meaning-making and meaning-using processes that connect man to culture. (Bruner, 1990, p. 12)

Like Bruner, Shweder (1990), and others, I suggest that developmental psychology needs to focus on acts of meaning. Only if we do so will we be able to discern and take responsibility for the cultural underpinnings—and cultural blind spots—of our theories of human development. Critics have argued that developmental psychology relies too heavily on unexamined as-

sumptions and tacit values rooted in parts of the Western cultural heritage. In the previous chapter, Vandenberg and O'Connor (chap. 9, this volume) indicate how the notion of development has been linked with modern Western notions of *progress*. Others have pointed out that our conceptions of development appear to assume *individualistic* assumptions and values that shape what our theories designate as the desired endpoint of development (Cirillo & Wapner, 1986; Cushman, 1991; Harkness, Raeff, & Super, 2000; Kaplan, 1986; Kim & Choi, 1994; Kirschner, 1996; Riegel, 1972; Sampson, 1977; Shweder, 1998).

In the modern West, we tend to share commonsense, taken-for-granted understandings of ourselves as separate, autonomous, self-motivated agents. Geertz (1983) provided the classic description and this outlook when he wrote:

The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's culture. (p. 59)

It is illuminating to compare this notion of the person with the one designated by the Japanese word for self, *jibun*, which literally means "self part," implying that the self by itself is not the basic unit of identity (Rosenberger, 1992). As Markus and Kitayama (1991) observed:

[I]n some cultures, at least, on certain occasions, the individual, in the sense of a set of significant inner attributes of the person, may cease to be the primary unit of consciousness. Instead, the sense of belongingness to a social relation may become so strong that it makes better sense to think of the relation as the functional unit of conscious reflection. (p. 226)

A result, as discerned by Tobin, Wu, and Davidson (1989), is that for many Japanese, "a child's humanity is realized most fully not so much in his ability to be independent from the group as his ability to cooperate and feel part of the group" (p. 39).

In the field of psychology, the legacy of the great 17th-century philosopher René Descartes weighs heavily on us. Along with John Locke, Descartes authored what Charles Taylor (1989, pp. 159–176) called the modern *punctual self*, the self as an extensionless center of pure agency that, because it is unconstrained by prior bonds to the world, is capable of making and remaking its identity as it wishes. Taylor showed how this notion of a disengaged self crops up again and again in Western thought. The assumption of such a highly individualistic, punctual self poses at least two major problems for developmental psychology. First, it greatly obscures how very different kinds of selves or identities develop in different cultural eras or contexts. If we

ignore that ours is just one way of being human, we risk a disrespectful and imperialistic attitude and approach. Second, it turns out to be very difficult to explain the development of such a separate, sovereign, highly autonomous self out of the dense nexus of dependencies and interdependencies that constitute childhood and cultural life generally. We might say that these theories have a hard time explaining how greater human capacities and maturity naturally grow out of the soil of social life rather than being wrested from life by the force of an individual will.

To its credit, developmental psychology has worked hard in recent years to become more culturally sensitive, in part by including individuals from other cultural groups and traditions in its research. But a more adequate overall theoretical or philosophical perspective on human development is needed if we truly are to avoid misinterpreting others from our cultural vantage point. Fashioning such a perspective will be a great challenge. On the one hand, there almost certainly are some fundamentals or universals of being human and developing over time into more capable and mature people. On the other hand, different cultures and different experiences within cultures shape very different kinds of people, with quite different characters or identities and quite different visions of the good life. I think it might now be possible to sort out these two sides of the story and do justice to both in a more plausible and cohesive picture of human development. Of course, I can only roughly sketch what might be some of the contours of such an approach. To this end, in the remainder of the chapter, I weave together insights from interactivism, an emerging school of thought developed by Mark Bickhard and his colleagues, and the hermeneutic philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Charles Taylor.

PROCEDURAL KNOWING AND BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

Building on the philosophy of pragmatism and formed in dialogue with Piagetian principles, the interactivist view (Bickhard, 1980, 1992a, 1992b, 2000; Bickhard & Christopher, 1994; Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Campbell, Christopher, & Bickhard, 2002) considers development at its heart to be characterized by the ability to abstract from or transcend the patterns of interaction and thought that we are currently engaged in so that we can move to a “higher” level in which we can reflect on what we had previously taken for granted. Piaget (2000) referred to this ability as *reflective abstraction*. It can be defined as “the relationship between adjacent levels of knowing . . . in which properties resident in a given level, implicit in the organization or functioning of that level, are explicitly known at the next higher level” (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986, p. 85). If we begin with reflective abstraction as a basic developmental principle, then we need to describe what the “ground” of human development is, what is the first level on which such differentiation can begin to occur.

Interactivism refers to the ground of development—our most basic and developmentally earliest way of existing—as “Knowing Level 1.” At this level, which occurs from infancy to about age 4, knowledge is constituted in the ability to interact with the world. Our earliest forms of knowing center around learning what procedures work in the world. Knowledge is initially a thoroughly procedural affair. Through trial and error, infants learn procedures for how to do or accomplish various things. At first, such procedures involve the beginnings of motor coordination, simply learning how to move limbs. Knowledge comes from learning in a sensorimotor way the consequences of moving different parts of the body at different times when in the proximity of different kinds of objects. An infant will learn, for instance, that kicking the side of the crib shakes a mobile. Infants also begin to develop procedures that have social and emotional considerations: They learn what impact crying or smiling has on their caretakers. Through the process of trial and error, or what interactivist theory terms a *variation and selection constructivism*, infants begin to develop increasingly more sophisticated patterns of interacting with their world, both of objects and of people. What is crucial about Knowing Level 1 is that *all* of the knowledge and learning that occurs does so in an unreflective, pre-self-conscious way. Prior to age 4 there is no self-aware, self-directed sense of personal agency that guides learning and development. Infants and young children know and learn without knowing that they know. It is with the subsequent level, Knowing Level 2, that children for the first time develop a sense of self that can know and reflect on the world and their experience of it.

Research on the development of memory corroborates the interactivist understanding of Knowing Level 1. The most fundamental form of memory seems to be procedural or enactive memory (Tulving, 1985). This is the memory of how to do things. Procedural memory stores the knowledge of how to turn a door knob or ride a bicycle. Episodic or event memory, the recollection of events that stand out from the flow of experience, develops considerably later. This is the type of memory that we most frequently associate with memory—for example, the memory of internal images of specific events, like a childhood birthday party. Event-based memory can contain images of ourselves interacting with others and can include the thoughts and feelings we had at the time. Procedural memory, in contrast, is more rudimentary, being mainly about what to do in concrete situations and lacking the capacity to store self-conscious occurrences.

The hermeneutic philosopher Martin Heidegger (1962) helps to broaden and deepen our understanding of this most basic kind of living and learning that interactivism calls Knowing Level 1. Heidegger was concerned with the way that much of Western culture splits the subject off from the object, the self from others, the mind from the body, and facts from values. Heidegger believed that this dualistic outlook distorts the fact that at the most fundamental level we are beings engaged in the world doing things, what he called

being-in-the-world. His classic example of this is a craftsman in a workshop. Heidegger draws attention to the phenomenology or actual lived experience of the craftsman who is engaged in building something. For such a person who is hammering two things together, the hammer is not experienced as a separate and discrete object that the person is set over and against. The hammer is instead an extension of the person. Hammers, nails, wood, and the person are all caught up in and subsumed by the bigger project. Hammers, nails, wood, and the person are all different aspects of a more experientially primary activity, namely building something. In fact, “objects” only become recognized as separate objects when they no longer fit seamlessly into the current activity; when, for instance, we have a ball peen hammer in hand but we really need a sledge hammer.

In this way, Heidegger tries to describe the most fundamental and enduring way that humans exist in the world, one very different from what Descartes thought was most primary, namely the *cogito*, the *I* that thinks. Heidegger believes that we are not basically *detached knowers* of objective facts (including, sometimes, facts about ourselves) that we seek to manage, manipulate, or control for our purposes. Only occasionally do we approach the world that way as natural scientists or everyday problem solvers. Rather, we are fundamentally much less reflective and much less control-oriented *participants* in a meaningful lifeworld. Heidegger has a distinctive conception of that world or lifeworld in which we are immersed and participate. According to Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon (1999), Heidegger

resists the temptation to see the meaningfulness of things as mere “projections” of human mental “coloring” onto intrinsically meaningless and valueless objects. Heidegger wants us to see that, in our initial, everyday, pre-reflective encounter with the world, things show up for us directly as already value-laden and as having significance. While it is certainly true that meanings cannot exist unless there are agents (humans) in the world, there is no reason to think that meanings exist only in our minds. Instead, they are as much a part of the furnishings of the world as mass, velocity and position. On this view, then, meanings and values do not exist in our heads; they are “out there” in the dynamic life-world we encounter in our day-to-day affairs. On this view, the subjectivization of meaning and value in modern naturalism is a high-level theoretical construct, the result of a sort of “breakdown” in our ordinary being-in-the-world, which gives us no insight into the true nature of reality as we actually encounter it. (p. 209)

Thus, hermeneutic writers stress that the mature human agent is not a “thinking substance,” a la Descartes, a mind that ideally adopts an “outsider” viewpoint, gazing as objectively as possible on the world. Rather, this approach insists on holding fast to an “insider’s” perspective as the

source from which all reflection, including philosophy, ultimately originates. The awareness that we cannot escape the insider’s perspective re-

sults from acknowledging our own “finitude”—our rootedness in a cultural, historical, and linguistic context we can never fully objectify or ground. (Guignon, 1991, pp. 96–97)

Heidegger shows us that the practical, procedural, largely un-self-conscious flow of living and learning that goes on at the first level of knowing continues as the basic reality and rhythm of a human life throughout its course. Heidegger’s craftsman represents quite an advancement, of course, over an infant finding a way to make noise by banging his or her toy hammer on the side of the crib. But the former is an extension and refinement of the latter, not a leap to a qualitatively different kind of knowing and living. As an adult, the craftsman will have his moments of self-consciousness, explicit analysis, perhaps even formal theorizing, in the service of his aims. But these are temporary interruptions in the more practical, intuitive flow of living in which we apprehend and appreciate things more directly and immediately as “engaged agents” (Taylor, 1995, p. 21) who take for granted the folkways and mores of our community or culture.¹

SOCIAL PRACTICES

Heidegger’s craftsman working on a project is an example of a social practice, an activity that draws its meaning from a larger social context. The building of a bookshelf only makes sense within a society that is literate, values books, and most likely is relatively sedentary. Heidegger maintains we are born into and take over in a largely preconscious way an unending series of social traditions and practices. American children, for example, learn early on about “going shopping” and over time know how to navigate through malls on their own. In doing so, Heidegger would argue, they not only learn the various physical and social mechanics to shop; they are all participating in, taking over, and reinforcing the social meanings and values that give birth to shopping and malls in the first place. Similarly, the members of a traditional Japanese village learn the subtle art of deliberating together until a virtually unanimous consensus is achieved. How different is our way of life in which we decide many basic moral and social issues through elections

¹None of this means that we cannot criticize the values and practices of our society or way of life. According to Richardson, Rogers, and McCarroll (1998),

Thus, the practical flow of living is already defined for us by particular commitments and identifications taken for granted by our culture. They are our starting point. We can and often should criticize various of our norms and practices. But, in the hermeneutic view, we always critique them on the basis of other commitments or insights from our traditions that for the moment we take for granted. In this view, our various cultural and moral traditions are actually rich resources for such critique. The common view of them as stable, monolithic authorities is actually a narrow, prejudiced outgrowth of the Enlightenment. In fact, they seem essentially to be multivocal, interminably noisy debates rather than static pronouncements or sets of norms. (p. 507)

with secret ballots! In these worlds, values are not separated off from facts. Our behaviors reveal what Heidegger (1962) called *care*. What we do, where we focus our time and attention, indicates what we find meaningful, compelling, or of undeniable worth to us.

Recently social theorists, many influenced directly by Heidegger or, as with the Russian sociocultural school, by Marx and Hegel, have sought to draw out the implications of what it means to be engaged or immersed in social practices. Indeed, notice has been taken of a significant “practice turn” in much contemporary social theory (Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & Savigny, 2001). According to Pierre Bourdieu (1990), social practices are “actions that are repeated, shared with others in a social group, and invested with normative expectations, meaning, or significance that go beyond the immediate goals of the action” (p. 13). Miller and Goodnow (1995) stressed the importance of social practices as “contexts for development” and suggest that they have these five main features:

1. Practices provide a way of describing development-in-context, without separating child and context and without separating development into a variety of separate domains.
2. Practices reflect or instantiate a social and moral order.
3. Practices provide the route by which children come to participate in a culture, allowing the culture to be “reproduced” or “transformed.”
4. Practices do not exist in isolation.
5. The nature of participation in practices has consequences. (pp. 8–13)

The social or cultural practices approach helps us to move beyond our conventional dualistic ways of thinking about life by pointing to the patterns of interactions that precede the separation of the world into subjects and objects, selves and others, facts and values, and minds and bodies. The social practice perspective also help us to think more deeply about the nature of culture itself. Often, in psychology, attempts to take culture into account rely on Bronfenbrenner’s (1977) ecological model of human development, or a similar view, in which concentric circles around a core are used to depict the self. Geertz (1973) described such models, which he called “stratigraphic models of the self,” in this way:

Strip off the motley forms of culture and one finds the structural and functional regularities of social organization. Peel these off in turn and one finds the underlying psychological factors—“basic needs” or what-have-you—that support and make them possible. Peel off psychological factors and one is left with biological foundations—anatomical, physiological, neurological—of the whole edifice of human life. (p. 37)

The downside of such attempts to factor culture into the equation of human development is that it reduces culture to a mere extraneous context. Models and theories that take this approach adopt and reinforce the supposition that the individual is ontologically prior to the social; that it somehow makes sense to think of the individual as a biological entity existing independently of society and culture. Different versions of this notion of the self have been much touted in modern times as a bulwark against violations of individual autonomy, rights, and integrity by the state or others. Unquestionably, it has served that worthy end. But that may turn out to be like cutting off one's foot to cure an infected toe—eliminating all or most of culture to get rid of bad culture, so to speak (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Cushman, 1990; Lasch, 1979; Putnam, 2000). In the end, it may encourage a destructive emotional isolation and erode the social ties and commitments that alone make freedom or autonomy meaningful.

Cole (1996), Shweder (1990), Kashima (2000), and Poortinga (1997), among others, offered trenchant critiques of the many approaches in which culture is treated, essentially, as a mere additional, independent variable in the explanation of behavior. What these approaches ignore is the degree to which culture precedes us. Culture, rather than consisting mainly of beliefs and values that become internalized, is implicit in the patterns of interaction the child learns from infancy onward. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Geertz (1973, p. 5) considered a human being to be “an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun” and “culture to be those webs” of meaning that underlie all social functioning and give sense and coherence to our lives. These webs of significance permeate our lives so thoroughly that any attempt to separate human nature from culture is distorting and incoherent. In this spirit, Cole (1996) wrote, “An ‘act in its context’” might be understood in terms of a “weaving metaphor” that requires a “relational interpretation of mind; objects and contexts arise together as part of a single bio-social-cultural process of human development” (p. 136). Thus, culture is more than a context; it is a ground of human being and inseparable from such being, which is why Bruner (1990) characterized us as “expressions of culture.” The interactivist concept of *implicitness* can help to deepen our understanding of how culture is woven into the very marrow of our being.

IMPLICITNESS

Implicitness is a way of addressing how values, meanings, and assumptions are inherent or entailed in our thoughts, feelings, and behavior without them having to somehow be internalized or known by the person. One of the consequences of individualistic assumptions about the self is that they presuppose that the boundaries of the person are roughly at the surface of the

skin, creating a divide between the internal and the external realms. This split brings with it the problem for developmental psychology of accounting for how external influences, like socialization agents, can affect the internal experience and subjectivity of the developing person (Bickhard & Christopher, 1994; Christopher & Bickhard, 1992). Typically, developmentalists assume that for something to have an influence on the child it must be internalized or in some way brought into or made present within the mind of the child. Different psychological mechanisms are posited to take what is outside and internalize or introject it so that it becomes a part of the developing child. For instance, attachment theory relies on a notion of internalization to create internal working models of primary caretakers. Theorists such as Piaget (1945/1962), Piaget and Inhelder (1966/1971), Vygotsky (1978), Valsiner and Lawrence, (1997), and Wertsch and Stone (1985) have used notions of internalization as a key element of their theories. And still other theories simply posit the existence of some internal belief or representational structure such as low self-esteem or unconscious self or object representations to account for the child's behavior. Among other problems, these approaches tend to attribute to the child cognitive capabilities that the child does not yet possess, making it difficult to account adequately for his or her behavior or growth (Bickhard & Christopher, 1994; Christopher, Bickhard, & Lambeth, 2001). Implicitness is a way of bypassing this issue by suggesting that these influences can occur without a sharp internal–external or objective–subjective divide needing somehow to be broached. From the interactionist perspective, the notion of such a divide is based on a faulty individualistic premise: namely, that the individual is sharply distinct from its context. The notion of implicitness allows us to conceive of how the environment can influence a person without requiring that the source of the influence be a kind of thing or force present within the person. In more formal terms, certain things can be functionally true of an entity in interaction with its environment without those things having to be necessarily present or existent anywhere within the entity.

A very simple example of implicitness at work is a thermostat. For a thermostat to do what we want it to do, a number of things must be presupposed in its basic design and functioning. A thermostat assumes that the temperature will not exceed a certain range and that changes in temperature are relatively gradual. These kinds of presuppositions are instantiated in the design of a thermostat but are not actually present—they are implicit.

The patterns of interaction that a child learns from infancy onward within the family constellation embody a number of implicit presuppositions or tacit meanings—the sort of meanings that hermeneutic thought, as we saw, views as being as much in the world “out there” as “in here” in the mind. For example, consider an infant raised in the 1950s in a responsible but stereotypically emotionally distant American Protestant family. Armed with the latest child-rearing manuals, the parents maintain strict, clock-based care-

taking routines. Attempting to instill independence and emotional maturity, they insist on the infant learning to “cry it out” alone and sleep by herself. We can easily imagine that the infant would cry for food, attention, and emotional responsiveness in response to various basic needs and promptings. However, the infant soon would discover that such cries go largely unheeded and that crying only exacerbates her discomfort by causing additional physiological and emotional stress. Through trial and error, the infant happens on quietude and a degree of passivity much of the time as the best solution.

Any pattern of interaction and way of being like this has layers of presuppositions or tacit meanings. In this case, the lack of responsiveness to the infant *per se* presupposes that other things are more important than the infant’s current emotional needs. It also implies that self-control, orderliness, tight schedules, and a healthy dose of self-denial should take precedence over emotional displays of dependency or need and spontaneous caring responses to them. It implies that the kind of more or less rigid autonomy that is built by this regimen is the cornerstone of the most dignified and decent kind of life, one that ought to be nurtured by one and all and that in some sense may be the most satisfying kind of life, the truly good life, over the long run. Thus, one very specific pattern of interaction like this can entail an extensive web of presuppositions or meanings concerning the nature of the self, others, and the whole of life. However, the interactivist notion of implicitness guards against prematurely attributing such presuppositions to specific cognitive elements (such as internal representations, beliefs, schemas, etc.) in the child’s mind. Various presuppositions or tacit meanings may be implicitly present in the infant’s way of being in the world even though the infant is not yet cognitively capable of having *any* of the explicit cognitions that would be necessary to conceive of such things as self-control, caring, indifference, or propriety as qualities and powerful determinants of her own or other people’s way of life.

Meanings or presuppositions of this sort are not simply about the child. They also hold for the environment, for the whole world the child knows. They refer to patterns of interaction that undercut and transcend simple dichotomies of self and object. The infant and young child are cognitively incapable of making distinctions or differentiating the properties of the current environment from other possible environments. They also are incapable of differentiating who contributes what to any given interaction. Moreover, the child cannot cognitively differentiate a sense of self from the totality of his or her being. As a consequence, interactive patterns are not something children have or engage in as self-aware, choosing individuals. Rather, they are prereflective players in a game of life that is the only game or world they know. Such interactive patterns or social practices afford ways of being, but these ways of being are implicitly about the entire world, actual and potential, not just this part of it into which they have been born. Children are not able to differentiate the way of life that they have learned from other possible

ways of life. “A *lack* of differentiation of this situation from others, of these caregivers from others, *implicitly presupposes* totality, again without any explicit cognitions or cognitive capabilities on the part of the infant” (Bickhard & Christopher, 1994, p. 244).

Implicitness affords developmental psychology a way to model how the social practices in which we are immersed influence us without our having to be aware at all of this influence. Implicitness addresses how it is that we live on the basis of meaningful self-interpretations and interpretations of life without our needing at any point to actually make such interpretations or even consciously know what these interpretations are. It is also a way of discussing culture that avoids treating culture as either external to the individual or located in the individual’s mind. As such, the concept of implicitness helps to correct a tendency for the interpretive and narrative dimension of hermeneutic thought to be understood in an overly mentalistic or intellectual manner. Thus, interactivism may contribute something essential to explicating what Taylor (1993) seemed to mean by a “fully engaged agency.”

HIGHER LEVELS OF KNOWING

So far, I have been discussing Knowing Level 1 and what is available to the child at that level. With cognitive maturation, the child develops the capacity for what interactivist thinkers call Knowing Level 2 (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Campbell et al., 2002). On the basis of reflective abstraction, the child develops the ability to differentiate from and represent what he or she was initially immersed in. The child begins to reflectively abstract from the patterns of interaction and social practices he or she has learned. At Knowing Level 1, the child cannot know himself or herself. At Knowing Level 2, the child can begin to explicitly know the self. Knowing Level 2 can potentially make aspects of Knowing Level 1 explicitly known and understood. Examples of Knowing Level 2 would be the kinds of self-beliefs and self-statements that can be spoken to others and ourselves. It requires Knowing Level 2 to be able to articulate (even in a rudimentary way) who we are, how we are different from other people, and what is important to us. At Knowing Level 1, these things are implicit.

At Knowing Level 1, the goals that guide a child’s behavior and interactions are implicit; the child just lives out these goals. At the next knowing level, the child can consciously know what these goals are and begin to organize them around higher order goals. For instance, a child may develop a higher order goal of not upsetting her parents. Such a goal would help a child learn to subordinate or deselect certain Level 1 goals, like playing with her mother’s office equipment that experience has shown conflict with this higher order goal. Level 2 goals then can direct the formation and selection of goals at Level 1. Knowing Level 2 begins to develop at around 4 years of age. Evidence for Knowing Level 2 includes the development of metacognition

(Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1986; Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Perner, 1991, 1992) and of autobiographical memory (Nelson, 1992, 1994).

The process of reflective abstraction is potentially unbounded. The knowing levels as a cognitive process are potentially infinite (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986). A third knowing level can emerge that is able to know aspects of the second; aspects of Level 3 can potentially be known by Level 4, and so on. At Level 3 the person can begin to engage in the process Erikson (1963) termed *identity formation*. While operating at Level 2, the child is an identity but would not be said to *have* an identity. At Level 3, however, the child can begin to *have* an identity. To have an identity means to know one's identity, to compare it with others, to explicitly evaluate it at times, and possibly to try to transform it. As Campbell and Bickhard (1986) described:

The child at the first level, then, implicitly has a self, but cannot know that self. At the second level, the child knows that self, and thereby has an implicit representation of his or her self. At the third level, the child can know that self-representation, thereby making it explicit. Now the child can compare his or her self to a system of alternatives, judge it against values, and construct it in accordance with those judgments. (p. 119)

Level 3 is also the level at which we can form metavalues, or values about values. In terms of the self, at Level 3 people can form explicit judgments about what kind of a person they are and what kind of a person they ought to be. Research suggests that Level 3 begins to emerge from 9 to 11 years of age (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986).

The knowing levels complement the hermeneutic emphases on our situatedness in cultural practices and on narrative and dialogical understandings of identity by providing a developmental account of how both aspects of human being emerge. We are both situated in culture and capable, through the higher knowing levels, of attaining the kind of self-reflexiveness that we characteristically see as definitive of human agency. Thus, the account of knowing levels provides an expanded model of engaged agency.

Unlike some stage theories of development, like those of Piaget and Inhelder (1966/1969),² Kohlberg (1984), or Kegan (1982), the knowing levels are not global cognitive structures that require simultaneous or near simultaneous levels of development across all domains of the person's life. They are instead a capacity that may or may not be realized. Most often, higher levels of knowing come into play in some areas of our life and not in others. Knowing Level 1 is always operating; the other levels are in a sense incidental or supplemental to it.

²However, Chapman (1988) argued powerfully that psychology has often distorted Piaget's work by attributing to him the oversimplified claim that "cognitive stage development is inherently linked with age and that the concept of structure implies synchrony in development across different areas of content" (p. 2).

In the interactivist view, multiple meanings and goals are always at work with human beings. A variety of implicit meanings and goals exist at Level 1 in various states of conflict and convergence. With the development of higher knowing levels, additional meanings and goals emerge and interact with those of Level 1. Consequently, human beings consist of a variety of goals, values, and meanings that exist at different levels of knowing and in various states of tension and harmony. In this way interactivism is similar to Mikhail Bakhtin's (Morson & Emerson, 1990; Wertsch, 1991) view that human beings are constituted by a polyphony of voices. The interactivist contribution is to see these multiple voices existing at different levels of awareness; some exist implicitly in behavior and feeling, others are explicitly known in our thoughts and beliefs, and still others are implicit in what we are consciously aware of.

There is in interactivism an inborn conservatism with regard to how much of ourselves we can consciously know. In this sense interactivism is similar to the hermeneutic view that we are situated in our lives and can never be fully away of ourselves. In Heidegger's (1962) words, we are "proximally and for the most part" being-in-the-world; in the words of interactivism, Level 1 is always ontologically primary. Consequently, we can often best know ourselves "not by inward turning and introspection" in the manner of Descartes, "but by catching sight of ourselves as we are engaged and preoccupied in everyday contexts" (Guignon, 1984, p. 232). One implication of this is that who we are, in a sense, is distributed across the knowing levels. We are both the sense of self that is implicit in the behavioral choices we make on an ongoing basis and also who we consciously think we are and identify with. Thus, we might say that through the knowing levels mode, interactivism integrates, on the one hand, the emphasis of Marx, Heidegger, Vygotsky, and Luria on the situated and embedded aspect of human agency with, on the other, the revelations of Descartes regarding the *cogito*, the thinking subject.

MORAL VISIONS: THE BACKDROP OF DEVELOPMENT

Interactivism and hermeneutic thought agree that there is much about human existence that is implicit and cannot be fully known by us. A rich tapestry of assumptions and ideals undergirds patterns of interaction and social practices. These implicit assumptions and values link the individual and culture. Much of the story of human development has to do with how individuals lives and identities are shaped at the core by these assumptions and values, which they reinterpret and extend in different ways, to one extent or another, over the course of their living. Perhaps everyone puts their unique stamp on their culture's story concerning what life is all about at the same time that none of us are as unique as we sometimes think we are.

Geertz (1973) defined culture as having two basic dimensions: worldview (or *Weltanschauung*) and ethos. A culture's *worldview* is its more cognitively oriented maps of reality. Worldviews describe the nature of the universe or cosmos, its principles of causality, its understanding of time and space, and its theories about the inhabitants of the universe, including people. A culture's *ethos*, in contrast, refers to the more aesthetic and ethical dimensions of life. An ethos delineates what constitutes the good, beautiful, and desirable. The "webs of significance" that Geertz suggested comprise human culture roughly integrate the different aspects of a culture's worldview and ethos.

For example, infants and children in middle America are quickly initiated into the custom of taking baths. When children participate in bathing rituals and eventually come to adopt them on their own, they are participating in the elements of culture that are implicit in the activity. For instance, some of what is implicit in taking a bath are elements of worldview: To be able to take a hot bath requires a considerable amount of technological and scientific understanding regarding porcelain, metallurgy, hydrology, plumbing, water sanitation, and so on. We take for granted that turning the tap will give us clean hot water. However, for this tap-turning behavior to work, a wealth of background knowledge that is not actually present in material artifacts or in the minds of most of the people taking baths is required. Thus, much of this activity rests ultimately on the hard-won scientific worldview and technology cultivated by our civilization.

An ethos is also implicit in bathing. We bathe in the ways we typically do in American culture because of a variety of values concerning the significance of bathing. These values may include "Cleanliness is next to Godliness," the association of cleanliness with responsibility, health, success, and well-being, and the value of neutralizing much of the evidence of certain human bodily functions: sweat, odor, or skin and hair oils. Indeed, these presuppositions shape our view of maturity, wellness, and even mental health (one of the diagnostic criteria of schizophrenia has to do with neglecting one's hygiene). Bathing is also associated with nurturing ourselves: American culture has developed whole industries designed to pamper the self and buffer it from the perceived ravages of nature and harshness of the world of work—legacies of our Romantic heritage (Bellah et al., 1985; Taylor, 1985). However, none of these cultural values or assumptions need to be consciously recognized by the individual for culture to be propagated and reinforced through the practice of bathing.

What some writers call folk psychologies (Bruner, 1990) or indigenous psychologies (Heelas & Lock, 1981) may be thought of as subsets of cultural values and assumptions that pertain to human beings. A folk psychology is the popular, usually implicit, understanding of such things as motivation, emotion, deviance or psychopathology, well-being, morality, and the self. Folk psychologies provide

a set of more or less connected, more or less normative descriptions about how human beings “tick,” what our own and other minds are like, what one can expect situated actions to be like, what are possible modes of life, how one commits oneself to them, and so on. (Bruner, 1990, p. 35)

One basic dimension of a folk psychology defines what a person is and what his or her capabilities, resources, and characteristics are. In this way, a culture’s worldview determines the ontology of the person or what and who we think we are. Another aspect of a folk psychology delineates norms, standards, or parameters for desirable ways of functioning and interacting. This part of the folk psychology that shapes notions of what a person ought to be is informed by a culture’s ethos. Thus, worldviews lay out the nature of the person that will develop, whereas ethos guides the direction that development should take.

One implication of such a perspective is that all people, as Kaplan (1986) noted, are in a sense developmental psychologists. Each of us have some sense of what promotes and hinders growth and development. *Developmental* folk psychologies may be partially explicit but are more often implicit in the received customs and social practices surrounding child rearing and later developmental stages.

I use the term *moral visions* to acknowledge that implicit in our ways of being in the world and the social practices that collectively organize our existence are the answers to two fundamental existential questions: What is a person, and what should a person be or become? Moral visions refer to the constellations of cultural values and assumptions that constitute our understanding of the nature of the person and of the good life (Christopher, 1996, 2001). In much modern thought in general and academic psychology in particular, cultural and moral meanings and values are treated as subjective projections onto a neutral world of facts. But I have suggested that hermeneutic philosophy helps us appreciate anew that such meanings and values are no more “in our heads” as they are “out there,” part of the very fabric of the dynamic lifeworld into which our lives are woven. From both hermeneutic and interactivist perspective, values and goals inhere in all human activity. Implicitly or explicitly, moral visions inform us about what is deemed higher, deeper, or more worthy. Thus, they define what gives us strength, integration, wholeness, vitality, dignity, and goodness, and they direct us in how we can embody these ideals (Taylor, 1989). Conversely, our moral visions define what we should avoid, resist, or oppose, both internally and externally. Moral, in this sense, has less to do with rules concerning what is right or wrong as with our deepest understanding of what is good, worthy, and desirable (Brinton, 1987).

In line with this notion of moral vision, Taylor (1988) argued that human beings necessarily exist in an “inescapable” moral framework that he called a *moral topography* or *moral space*. To give a feel for this notion of moral space, Taylor (1988) noted that all people have a sense of what it means to be “out-of-joint”:

This is conceptually expressed in a host of ways: as being lost, or condemned, or exiled, or unintegrated, or without meaning, or insubstantial, or empty, to name some categories. Corresponding to each of these descriptions of breakdown is some notion of what it would be to overcome it, to have integration, or full being, to be justified, or found, or whatever. But more, there is a notion of “where” this integration, fullness, etc., might come from, what might bring it about. . . . In other words, these different, often indefinite and tentative senses of what integration consists of incorporate notions of where it might be found, in the sense of where the strength lies, where the sources or resources are situated, which could bring integration, or fullness about. (pp. 300–301)

This perspective on moral visions recognizes that across cultures and over time human beings have formed quite different self-interpretations. These include different ways of defining the boundaries of the person or self (e.g., more or less individualistic or collectivistic ways) and different conceptions of the constituent elements of a person. Is the person composed of reason, will, and desire as Plato suggested; cognitions, emotions, and behavior as many contemporary psychologists believe; or the four siblings that exist on the astral plane as with the Balinese? Moral visions go further and prescribe what a person should be or become—the stance we should adopt toward aspects of ourselves, others, and the world. This aspect is well stated by Kaplan (1986), who observed that

different sociocultural groups may have different notions as to what constitutes ideal human development. They may also have different notions as to the “causes” that promote or preclude whatever they take to be ideal human development. And, finally, they may have different notions as to what has to be done to get individuals on the right track with regard to the approximation or attainment of ideal human development. (p. 92)

Sometimes moral visions or their components are explicitly known at higher knowing levels and therefore able to be communicated explicitly among people. Much of the time, however, they are implicit, operating at Knowing Level 1, and transmitted through the propagation of various social practices. Dunn (1988) provided compelling examples of how infants are inducted into the social world in this manner. Goodnow (1990) described how the kinds of messages, both verbal and nonverbal, that children receive from caretakers and other children contain “tacit messages” that draw them into the webs of meanings that encompass their community’s way of life. Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller’s (1987) account of social communication captured the way the moral dimension is interwoven into human activity. They maintained that moral socialization rests on children’s ability to “discern the moral order as it is dramatized and made salient in everyday practices” (p. 73).

In our conception of “social communication,” morally relevant interpretations of events by local guardians of the moral order (e.g. parents) are

typically presented and conveyed to young children in the context of routine family life and social practices. Those moral premises are carried by the messages and meanings implicit in the emotional reactions of others (anger or disappointment or “hurt feelings” over a transgression). They are carried by the verbal exchanges—commands, threats, sanction statements, accusations, explanations, justifications, excuses—necessary to maintain routine social practices. (Shweder et al., 1987, p. 73)

Bickhard (1989) argued that a valuing process is inherent in all human functioning, and Taylor (1989) contended that “Selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined themes” (p. 3). But this implicitness of moral visions in all social interactions has generally not been recognized by developmental psychology. To give just two examples, DeLoache and Gottlieb (2000), in conceptualizing the personal characteristics of the child, treated life skills as something quite separate from values and beliefs. In a similar vein, schools of research based around Kohlberg (1984), Turiel (Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987), and Eisenberg (Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, McNalley, & Shea, 1991) all restrict the moral dimension of human life to other-regarding behavior and matters of justice and rights, thus obscuring the ways that moral visions concerning what it is fundamentally good to do or be imbue *all* our activities. Until this narrowness of vision is corrected, developmental psychology will continue to somewhat distort the reality of human development in our own society as well as fail to do justice to other cultural perspectives (Campbell & Christopher, 1996a, 1996b; Shweder et al., 1987). Also, it will fail to heed possible insights from other strains within Western culture, such as the “civic republican” ethical and political philosophy stemming from Aristotle that is experiencing a considerable revival at present.³

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

What might developmental psychology look like if it were pursued within a perspective of the sort I have outlined in this chapter? First, developmental psychology would take a hard look at the question, “What is the developing self or agent that is the subject of developmental psychology?” The hermeneutic and interactivist ideas about human being and becoming I have dis-

³The following comments by the political philosopher Ronald Beiner (1992) illustrate well the tenor of this neo-Aristotelian, sometimes called *communitarian*, school of thought. Beiner suggested that the “central purpose of a society, understood as a moral community, is not the maximization of autonomy . . . but the cultivation of . . . a variety of excellences, moral and intellectual” (p. 14). Beiner also noted pithily that it is “not that liberal autonomy is a bad thing, but that without the ‘thick’ attachments provided by the kind of ethos that builds meaningful character, free choice . . . hardly seems worth the bother” (p. 37). My point is not to recommend these ideas—although I find them compelling—but to point out that they presuppose that what I have termed moral visions imbue all of social life, requiring us to reject the sharp dualism between fact and value that has been taken for granted by much modern social science theory and research.

cussed entail a profound critique of the individualistic cultural roots of much developmental psychology theory, research, and practice. This critique would point out that the familiar Western notion of the individual as (ideally) highly separate, autonomous, and self-reliant—if it does enshrine and advance moral ideals we rightly cherish—has serious flaws. It obscures that fact that we acquire this notion from one particular cultural tradition rather than discover it to be objectively and universally true through reason and science. Paradoxically, even though it was cultivated in the first place to oppose arbitrary authority, it has become rather imperialistic in its own right. And it deters meeting human needs for lasting social ties and loyalties and for any sort of deeper sense of purpose or meaning beyond being free from unjust interference and “doing one’s own thing” (Schumaker, 2001).

Second, given the argument of this chapter, developmental psychology would continue to reflect on and refine its basic presuppositions or ontology of human existence, perhaps drawing on the hermeneutic and interactionist perspectives I have outlined. I have tried to suggest how these perspectives might allow us to identify certain universals or constants across people and cultures without obscuring or downplaying the fact that diverse traditions and cultures cultivate a splendid if sometimes bewildering variety of moral visions concerning human maturity and the good life.

Third, developmental psychology, using what might best be termed an interpretive social science approach (Hiley, Bohman, & Shusterman, 1991; Rabinow & Sullivan, 1979, 1987), would study what Taylor (1985) called the wide *diversity of goods* as they relate to human development that exist both within and across cultures. Developmental psychology would examine (with the help of other branches of psychology, other social sciences, and humanities) the moral visions of other cultural groups, including local or indigenous understandings of the person and accounts of the good life. It would try to understand why these accounts are often so compelling to those who embrace them. Moreover, it would recognize that understandings of the self and the good life exist for people at different levels of knowing. Some of these are implicit and embodied in the daily actions and practices that Heidegger described as *structures of care*. Others are the more consciously expressed and espoused goods that are more readily accessible to self-reports and interviews. Understanding the interplay and development of these notions of the self and the good life at different levels of knowing would become an important topic of research. Developmental psychology would consider both professional and scholarly accounts as well as lay accounts of these matters. It would consider developmental changes in the structure of self-interpretations and goods that animate people’s lives, considering how they are influenced by and in turn influence social and economic forces. It would consider social practices and life forms as different “takes” on the meaning of life and be open to insights that might clarify them from history, philosophy, and cultural studies.

Finally, developmental psychology would become a more self-reflective discipline, including in a practical or ethical sense. Social inquiry understood as an interpretive process is not simply a method for understanding the goods that animate *others'* lives. It also applies to ourselves as theorists, researchers, and practitioners. We must recognize that such inquiry always represents (whether it knows it or not) one strand of the human search for understanding and wisdom about what constitutes a good and decent human life. In other words, social theory is always, in part, a "form of practice" (Richardson & Christopher, 1993). Social theory and social science, at their best, understand themselves to be part of the quest for understanding that Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) described as a "quest" that is "not at all . . . a search for something already adequately characterized . . . but always an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self-knowledge" (p. 219). The sort of developmental social inquiry discussed in this and the previous chapter, I believe, could help us become more self-aware and could be a usefully critical endeavor. It could help us better understand and critically sift the goods that come from both the community and the particular background of the researcher, including challenging the implicit developmental folk psychology that already exists within Western psychology. Put another way, in the terms of this chapter, we must apply the knowing levels to ourselves as developmental psychologist to understand not only what we consciously espouse and maintain (higher knowing levels) but also what is implicit in our practices (Knowing Level 1).

Gaining more clarity about ourselves and our traditions allows us to discern the ways that we fall short of our own best ideals. Moreover, through openness to the insights of other traditions and cultures, we acquire the opportunity to learn from others and possibly integrate some of their wisdom into our ways of thinking and living. As Paolo Friere (1970) concluded, "It is not our role to speak to the people about our own view of the world, nor to attempt to impose that view on them, but rather to dialogue with the people about their view and ours" (p. 77).

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