I. The Network Structure of Early TV

A. The network structure of early television was inherited from radio. Thus, an institutional study of early television should begin with how the networks were organized.

B. We will begin with NBC and CBS: since they were the most powerful of the radio networks, they were the most powerful of the television networks. Because of the talent raids, CBS was in a better position to sell itself to advertisers, and it did so. CBS would not relinquish its ratings lead for very long until the mid 1970s.

C. Because of its RCA backing, NBC was in a position to encourage the sales of television sets.

D. Constructed out of the 1941 Justice Department settlement, ABC became the third most important radio network in 1943, and consequently became the 3rd most important television network.

E. A fourth network, Dumont, featured programming in the early days of television, but quickly died (Fourth network studies will become important to us again in the late 1980s: FOX). Until the fragmentation of the television audience due to cable in the 1980s, TV was always considered a "zero sum" industry: that is, for one network to increase in the ratings, another would have to lose. This is because of the finite number of viewers. During the network era of American television, it seems that only 3 networks could share this finite number of people and still remain profitable. Four was just too many networks for the system to bear. Now, network financing works quite differently (due to conglomeration and synergy between industries).

History of early television characterized by three important shifts in programming

1. Shift from live shows to telefilmed shows

2. Shift from specials to series

--> These first two are usually described in terms of the shift from the "Golden Age" to the "Vast Wasteland"

3. Shift from single sponsor format advertising to magazine format advertising

Kepley tracks these shifts within NBC’s programming strategy, linking the shifts to changes in management: from Pat Weaver to Robert Sarnoff/Robert Kintner. These men were NBC’s earliest "programmers" (responsible for developing and viewing pilots for shows, selecting which of these pilots to develop into series, and where to put them on the network’s schedule). The vice president of programming at the network is an incredibly important job, and it is one that the institutional historian of television pays close attention to. If the object of importance in television studies is the entire schedule, and not individual programs, then the programmer of a television network is equivalent to the director of a film: that person responsible for the overall "vision" of a network’s product. Examples: Fred Silverman at ABC in the late 1970s (tits and zits television), Warren Littlefield at NBC in the 1990s ("Must See TV"). Kepley agues that Weaver’s programming strategy in the early days of NBC TV (1949-1955) was related to the network’s need to provide experimental programming to get people to buy television sets, while Sarnoff/Kintner’s programming strategy afterwards (1956-1965) met the network’s need to first stabilize and then minimize costs.

A. The Programming Strategies of Pat Weaver (1949-1955)

NBC’s television-related needs in late 1940s:

a. NBC needs television affiliates to maximize viewers for national advertising.

b. RCA needs interesting programming that is differentiated from radio in order to sell television sets.

Weaver’s three-fold programming response

1. "Spectaculars"/"event programming"

Weaver develops a series of live programs from New York City in order to attract these affiliates (economy of scale allows the network to pay this talent, produce these shows, individual affiliates could not afford to do so). The unique nature of the live programming (Milton Berle Show, live anthology drama) encourages people to buy TV sets.

2. In-House Production

Weaver develops a staple of in-house production of core programming: cheap to produce (NBC can control all production costs, do it in their own studios, Weaver developed an efficient unit producer system), magazine format advertising (to allow for smaller companies to advertise on television). Example: "The T-H-T Plan": Today, Home, Tonight.

3. Experimental Programming

Public Service Progamming: "Operation Frontal Lobes".

Culturally-uplifting Programming: Demanded that Your Show of Shows have an aria.

B. The Programming Strategies of Robert Kintner (1956-1965)

NBC’s economic position in 1955:

1. Getting beaten by CBS in the ratings, badly. RCA fails in its attempt to challenge IBM in the computer business. Thus, NBC had to begin paying for itself.

2. Due to the FCC’s channel allocation plan, cities usually had 2 slots for VHF channels. By 1955, NBC and CBS had secured these affiliates. Only UHF channels remained for ABC, Dumont, and the independents. Thus, there was no longer any need for NBC to compete for affiliates.

Robert Kintner is hired from ABC (where he had to keep costs down because of that network’s cash-poor situation) to minimize costs. His strategy at ABC was to farm out production to film studios (like Warner Bros.).

Robert Kintner’s four-fold austere NBC programming strategy

1. Telefilm programming

With the need for live programming gone, Kintner instituted a shift from expensive live programming to cheaper, more efficient, and sydicatable telefilm programming.

2. "Meat and Potatoes Schedule"

Abandon specials and event programming. Develop a regular series of programs that viewers will like ("meat and potatoes schedule", "least objectionable programming"): Westerns (Wagon Train), Game Shows (Twenty-One).

3. Licensing of Outside Program Suppliers

Continue his practice of outside production, where other companies would have to burden the costs for experimentation. NBC would only have to pay the outside producer a flat fee. If the show were successful, only NBC would glean all of the profits off of the advertising. Kintner at NBC establishes rapport with the talent agency MCA (its television production unit Revue Productions: Wagon Train) and Barry and Enright (Twenty One, Tic Tac Dough).

4. Using the News as a Bridge to Prime-time

Exception: the news. Kintner believed in an excellent news show ("The Huntley-Brinkley Report") to feed viewers into prime time. The excess expense of good news would thus be made up by the later shows. Further ameliorated by the shift in Fall 1963 to 30 minute news show, which was not much more expensive, and allowed for much more advertising revenue. Also advocated news specials because they were cheaper to produce than entertainment programs.

Since Kepley is an economic historian, he is interested in the ways that the television industry can be studied as a for-profit business. He argues that the TV industry is an example of a public goods industry (vs. A private consumption goods industry). Public Goods Industry: a business in which the product is such that once it develops the resources to serve a number of customers, then adding one more customer can be achieved without increasing costs (the "zero marginal cost"). For example, a mass transit system is a public goods industry (one more customer on the bus pays 50 cents for a ride, but his or her presence does not increase the cost to run the bus). The same is true for television: the goal is to produce a program at the minimal cost. Then, adding extra viewers increases the advertising rate, but does not increase the cost of producing the program. Seeing the television industry as a public goods industry is important because it helps us explain why experimenters are necessary to innovate programs, but why they are almost immediately replaced by people whose job it is to stifle innovation, to stabilize and minimize production costs (thus, the shift at NBC in the 50s from Weaver to Sarnoff/Kintner.

III. CBS

CBS’s unique economic history: Characterized by a virtually unprecedented management stability: William Paley (CBS Chairman of the Board) and Frank Stanton (CBS President)

1. The Color Television War (1940-1953)

1940: CBS develops a UHF-band color television system (inferior in quality to RCA’s B+W system)

1942-1945: "Television Freeze": due to the war, all channel allocations and other decisions put on hold

1947: FCC decides to go with RCA’s B+W system over CBS’s inferior color system. Six months later, the FCC Commissioner responsible for this decision is given a VP job at NBC!!!

1947: CBS develops a better VHF-band color TV system

1950: The FCC approves the CBS color system

1953: The FCC reverses its ruling (b/c 9M RCA B+W sets had already been sold) and goes with the RCA color-compatible B+W TV system

--> This fiasco results in CBS withdrawing from the TV hardware manufacturing business

2. The Rise of CBS to Industry Leadership (1947-1953)

A. CBS begins TV (1947: the date cited as the start of TV because of the FCC’s decision against the CBS color system) in a weakened position. It lost its manufacturing bid. Unlike the other networks (ABC, NBC, DuMont), it only owned 1 O+O (owned and operated station) out of its FCC-allowable 5.

B. However, CBS succeeds because of a) Paley’s populist programming strategy: "give most of the people what they want most of the time" and b) The Talent Raids (allows CBS to produce "packaged programs" complete with CBS brand and popular performers).

CBS Popular Programming Strategies

1. Sitcoms

Weekly Sitcoms (canned) over specails/variety shows (live)

NBC gets slaughtered on the talent raids. But even when it does sign Milton Berle, Bob Hope, and Fred Allen, CBS still wins here. Fred Allen never makes a successful shift to TV. Bob Hope is successful for specials, but not regular series. Milton Berle’s variety show is immensely successful, but his success as a regular weekly phenomenon lasts only 4 years. CBS, on the other hand, signs Jackie Gleason and Lucille Ball, and develops sitcoms around them.

CLIP #3: I Love Lucy ("Lucy Goes to the Hospital", 1/19/53): Ricky first sees the baby

The serial appeal of Lucy having the baby

2. Adaptations of Radio Shows

CBS produces television adaptations of all its popular radio shows:

The Goldbergs

I Remember Mama

CLIP #4: I Remember Mama ("Queen of the Bee", 1952): nostalgia linked to advertising

The Burns and Allen Show

The Jack Benny Program

Amos ‘n’ Andy -- fails because of protests, which I will discuss later

3. Star-driven Shows

CBS’s Paley believes in the importance of the star system: Arthur Godfrey, Lucille Ball.

4. Game Shows

CBS is popular programs, less intellectual. It pioneers the game show, with "The $64,000 Question."

CLIP #5: The $64,000 Question (1956): Sherlock Holmes questions

Serial nature of wanting to see returning contestants

5. Daytime Soap Operas

CBS achieves a huge daytime dominance: soap operas like The Guiding Light.

CLIP #6: The Guiding Light (2/18/55): Dr. Grant’s parents wonder where he is

Serial appeal of daytime drama

6. Anthology Series

CBS successful in its use of filmed programming: anthology series: Alfred Hitchcock Presents, The Twilight Zone, Perry Mason.

CLIP #7: Alfred Hitchcock Presents: Hitchcock selling real estate on the moon

Brand name recognition of Hitchcock trademark

7. Prestige Programming

The only place CBS loses is in prestige programming. NBC anthology dramas will vast praise, CBS’s Studio One less so. CBS’s Murrow’s See It Now is one of their few prestige successes.

C. Between 1946 and 1952, during CBS’s rise in TV, its profits quadruple. By the mid-1950s, CBS has all 5 of its O+O’s in place.

3. CBS’s Defensive Posture (1955-1959)

a. CBS makes the shift from live to filmed programming. Independent productions (like Perry Mason), designed to stave off FCC monopoly investigations.

b. Quiz Show Scandals assault the network. Paley fires CBS President Louis Cowan and hires James Aubrey.

4. CBS Unopposed Dominance (1960s)

James Aubrey hired in 1960. He is a ruthless bottom-liner.

He cancels Playhouse 90, the last live anthology drama.

Develops the mindless yet popular barnyard sitcoms

Achieves complete network control over its own schedule: example Jack Benny fired when he refuses to be sandwiched inbetween barnyard sitcoms. The last straw in the shift from hit show/performer power to network power/control over schedule.

Click Here to Return to the MTA 400 ("The History of Television") Syllabus

This page was last updated on January 8, 2001

Questions or comments?  Please phone me at (406) 994-6403 or send e-mail to:  metz@montana.edu

Walter Metz, Department of Media and Theatre Arts, Montana State University--Bozeman