Making Competition in the Healthcare Sector Work: What Would It Take?

Initiative for Regulation and Applied Economic Analysis Montana State University

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The Basic Problem: Neither Fish Nor Fowl

- The provision of medical care in the U.S. lacks cost and quality discipline across-the-board.
- There is no real market discipline, and government regulation is partial and not wholly effective (and oftentimes blunt and unsustainable).

Counting Up the Waste

	Mid-Range Estimate (2011, \$ Bil.)	
Failures of Care Delivery	128	
Failure of Care Coordination	35	
Overtreatment	192	
Administrative Complexity	248	
Pricing Failures	131	
Fraud and Abuse	<u>177</u>	
Total	910	
% of Total H.C. Spending	34%	

Source: Berwick and Hackbarth, Journal of the American Medical Association, 2012

The Key Question

The Key Question	What <i>process</i> has the best chance of bringing about continual improvement in the productivity and quality of patient care?			
Competing Views	A Governmental Process	A Market-Based Process		
Solutions	 Medicare-led "delivery system reforms" (Accountable Care Organizations, Bundling of Payments, Innovation Center) Governmental Push for Use of Health Information Technology Comparative Effectiveness Research Regulated Pricing 	 Create incentives for consumers to seek lower-cost care alternatives Foster competition among suppliers of medical care Facilitate a model of high-deductible insurance combined with integrated care delivery More Medicare Advantage and Part D than Medicare Parts A & B 		
Criticisms	 A fully governmental process is susceptible to regulatory capture and protection of mediocre incumbents; arbitrary price setting drives out willing suppliers, inhibits innovation, and lowers quality Cost control by supply control (queues) 	 Cost are concentrated in high-cost patients; consumer incentives play little role in choosing service use in these cases Markets exacerbate risk segmentation Relying entirely on markets and prices to allocate resources is inequitable to those with less ability to pay 		

ACOs in 2016

- 432 MSSP ACOs in 2016
 - 410 in Track 1 (95%) -- bonus payment only
- **Gross Program Savings = \$652 million**
- Net Program <u>Cost</u> (after bonus payments) = \$39 million
- 31% of ACOs produced savings (measured against a benchmark) beyond corridor (2-3%)
- 25% produced savings within corridor
- 44% increase costs (20%) beyond corridor
- Older ACOs produce more savings
- Physician-led ACOs produce more savings

Health Spending Growth

		Inflation-Adjusted		
	_	Average Annual Growth Rates		
		<u>2003-2010</u>	<u>2010-2015</u>	
Health Consumption Expenditures:				
	Aggregate	2.7%	2.7%	
	Per Capita	1.8%	2.0%	
Medicare:				
	Aggregate	6.0%	2.9%	
	Per Capita	3.8%	-0.2%	
<u>Medicaid</u> :				
	Aggregate	2.7%	4.8%	
	Per Capita	-0.6%	-0.3%	
Private Plans:				
	Aggregate	2.0%	2.7%	
	Per Capita	2.8%	1.5%	

Source: National Health Expenditure Accounts

The Many Obstacles to a Functioning Market

- Assymetric Medical Knowledge (Supplier Advantage)
- Dominance of Third-Party Payments
- Concentration of Spending in High-Cost Cases
- Licensure/Protection of Incumbency/Limitations
 on Innovation
- Opaqueness
- Excessive Horizontal Consolidation (Non-Competitive, Monopolistic Pricing)


Insurance Deregulation Won't Fix the Problem

- Insurance Deregulation Agenda:
 - Exemptions from ACA's Essential Health Benefits
 - More Flexibility for Age-Rating/Lower Premiums for Younger/Healthier Consumers
 - Allowance for Short-Term, Limited-Duration Plans
 - Association Health Plans
- These ideas would shift premium payments among consumers, but would not foster stronger market competition among providers of medical services.


Keep/Replace the Cadillac Tax

- Largest Tax Expenditure: \$4.6 Trillion Over Ten Years
- Regressive: Average Per Household of \$3,160 for Top 20 Percent, \$980 Per Household in Middle Quintile
- Leads to Excessive Insurance Coverage, Suppresses Wage Growth
- Employer Plans Cost 35% More Than They Would Without the Tax Break

Restructured Choices for Medicare Beneficiaries



HSAs: Standardized Clinical Packages



Available at AEI.org

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Improving Health and Health Care

An Agenda for Reform

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