_War, Violence and the Westphalia State System_ _as a Moral Community_ Richard W. Mansbach and Franke Wilmer (draft for conference group on Identities, Borders and Orders--please do not cite) The Westphalia or sovereign state evolved partly to perform the vital task of legitimating, limiting, channeling, and regulating collective violence, both in interstate relations as well as within the boundaries of the state. In this sense we can view the Westphalia state as a form of social organization and the regulation of violence as a feature of organized social life. City-states, fiefdoms, tribes, villages, confederations, and empires offer other examples of social organization which have counted the regulation of violence in social life among their functions. All of these forms have played a role in shaping the political cultures and experiences of the people and peoples who find themselves, in the late twentieth century, living in states within a system of states, and it is the state and state system which now claim to possess the sole legitimate authority to regulate violence. In this paper we examine the related propositions that (1) the forms of violence the state aimed to regulate as well as the way in which "problematic violence" has been constructed from the perspective of those exercising state authority are undergoing dramatic changes and, as a consequence (2) the regulation or management of violence by the state and state system is problematized by these changes. Some may go further by claiming that we are actually witnessing a declining capacity of the state to manage violence, but to assess this argument would necessitate a more thorough examination of the idea that the state has had some measure of success against which the proposition of decline can be evaluated Our position is more modest: the Westphalia state is both the agent and the structure through which norms delimiting legitimate and illegitimate violence internally and externally are constructed and acted on, and there is presently a dissonance between norms and state/state system efforts to regulate or manage the actual violence and threats of violence considered most problematic in the late twentieth century -- terrorism, proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, "war" crimes committed in the course of civil and regional conflicts, the violation of human rights, ethnic or communal conflict and genocide. We examine the way in the state was constituted internally as a moral community, while at the same time externally, in relations among "civilized" (i.e European and western) states, outward looking European states formed a core international moral community. Finally we will argue that underlying both the process of norm articulation and the kinds of violence problematic for international relations is the relationship between identity and borders insofar as the construction of moral boundaries presumes a kind of normative agreement among actors which is often expressed explicitly or implicitly as a politically relevant identity. In this way, nationalism becomes convoluted with citizenship and loyalty; and "civilization" with European or western identity Specifically, the articulation and application of norms pertaining to violence follows from actors' agreement about how to distinguish "bad" or problematic violence from "good" violence or enforcement, as well as their willingness to submit to what Hans Kelsen called the /grund norm/, which we assert can be thought of as a norm of reciprocity or moral equality.^(1) <#N_1_> Submission to a norm of reciprocity creates a status of moral equality among actors and represents an articulation of identity based on their "sameness." This, in turn, provides the basis for political community with regulatory authority. The authority to regulate, in other words, derives from an intersubjective agreement about actors' shared understanding of what constitutes "good" and "bad" violence.^(2) <#N_2_> Thus order, which aims to reduce uncertainty and arbitrariness in the use of force or violence, is intimately linked to the process of community formation and therefore the construction of identity insofar as it presumes normative agreement. What presently confounds an international order based on a system of Westphalia states (a product of European socio-historical processes, then extended globally through European colonization and twentieth century decolonization) in its efforts to regulate violence are contestations and transformations of identities, and consequently the intersubjective agreement necessary to constitute a stable moral community: among, within and across core European states, non-western states, and in relations between the two. One obvious manifestation of these struggles is the tension between globalization and fragmentation. The maintenance of an ordered (core) state system capable of acting decisively in response to problems of violence is predicated on the stability of boundaries constituting a moral community of normative agreement. Thus destabilization of identities obfuscates the boundaries on which moral community relies for consensus and legitimacy. We conclude by suggesting at least three possible trends stemming from these developments. *Identities and the Formation of Moral Communities* Until recently, theorizing about identity assumed ascribed, naturalized characteristics and the "objective" existence of identity categories. Within the past decade or so, however, interrogation of the identity-conflict relationship has moved many theorists and researchers to at least take into account, if not entirely adopt, a social constructionist perspective (Nagel 1996). When it has been explored, the link between identity and political mobilization has focused on non-state identity groups in conflict with one another or with the state, but scant attention has been paid to the way in which identity is constructed and sustained by the state and state system as the basis for legitimacy. Whether there "are" objective categories of identity or not is less important than how the subjective process of identity construction and maintenance figures into the process of political legitimation by presuming that some degree of normative agreement flows from common identity. Struggles over identity therefore have the potential to destabilize the state and state system. Any category of difference presumes a category (or standard, or in Gramscian terms, a hegemonic identity) of sameness against which difference is measured. Race, ethnicity, and even gender are categories of identity that are significant not because of some intrinsic significance but because of the /significance attached to their difference in contrast with a privileged identity category/ (Tickner 1996). Theorizing about identity, therefore, reveals the cognitive underpinning of "us" and "them" as bases for political and action and, we will argue, for legal regulation. Theorizing about identities is further complicated by the fact that identities demarcate psychological rather than territorial space and can be overlapping and intersecting, as well as exclusive (Burton 1978, 1984). While much attention has been paid to the construction of "otherness" and the consequences of exclusivity for "others," there has been little interest in exploring the significance of "sameness" as a social and political construction with moral consequences (Wilmer 1993, Opotow 1990, Kelman 1990). The significance attached to socially constructed sameness provides the foundation for moral boundaries that encompass communities of obligation based on reciprocity and fairness and, therefore, genuine political community.^(3) <#N_3_> First, an explanatory note about the term "moral community." We use the term in the same sense as those whose work has focused on moral exclusion (Opotow 1990, Kelman 1990). It does not connote specific agreement about the content of a moral or ethical code, but rather the belief by members /within/ a moral community that they are obligated to treat one another fairly and equitably on the basis of a reciprocity of obligation. Legal philosophers often wrangle with the norm of reciprocity as the basis for legal obligation, and we would agree with those who see it as an antecedent to legal obligations in a liberal society (Luhman 1972). However, for our purposes, moral communities may be formal (legal) or informal (normative) or both. In an informal sense, a moral community is somewhat a "community of caring" where members feel a special obligation to care for one another's well-being and view harm that comes to any members as something of a harm to all members. Kinship is an example of an informal boundary of moral community, though in kinship-based societies it may also constitute a more formal boundary. Though perhaps the term "community of caring" suggests a more conscious emotional attachment, this aspect of moral community can also be characterized in terms more commonly associated with the idea of citizenship and the state on matters of "common defense." Additionally, the more recent notion of collective security in international relations presumes that on matters warranting a collective security response, the community's security (a component of well-being) is understood as indivisible. Whether the solidarity that forms the basis for moral community is constructed in terms of class, ethnicity, gender, nationhood, citizenship, kinship or as the "family" or "community of civilized" states, all of these forms of reciprocal obligation share in common their basis on the bond of /sameness/. It is for this reason that moral communities also function to exclude "others," and as a consequence provide justification for treating others differently than one is obliged to treat those within the community group. By demarcating inclusion on the basis of sameness and exclusion on the basis of difference, moral communities designate boundaries of 'inside and outside" according to which justice is distributed. This has obvious application to the distribution of international justice through foreign policies. But they also serve to structure the distribution of justice internally, among members of the community. One fairly uncontroversial manifestation of the way in which they structure justice internally through the allocation of rights and responsibilities is on the basis of age or maturity -- the full range of rights and responsibilities of citizenship do not attach to individual members of a society until they reach an age of "majority" or moral competence. That is, individuals are presumed to mature from childhood into adulthood as morally competent members of a society upon reaching the age of majority, whereupon they are expected to understand the ethical or moral implications of the rights and responsibilities of membership/citizenship. While such an assumption about the adult-child relationship may seem uncontroversial in the context of a simple model of a society of individuals who in every other way understand themselves as equals, it also underlies the construction of moral boundaries and the distribution of justice in a variety of other relationships both within (state) societies and across (state) societies in the global system. For instance, the social, political and economic marginalization of women in structurally patriarchal societies is predicated on the assumption of women's moral inferiority to men, reflected in language that characterizes women in relation to men as /children to adults. /A similar structuring of relations is evident in policies relating to indigenous peoples (and the morally superior "modernizing" majority or dominant group) as well as, until recently, the relegation of Blacks/Africans to "second class citizenship" in South Africa and the United States (Wilmer 1993). On a global level the entire system of colonialism was based on an ideology of a "civilizing mission" or "the white man's burden (Doty 1996). Decolonization through the League of Nations system of mandates and the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations similarly reflects a ward-guardianship relationship between western and non-western peoples. And when delegates from predominantly western societies met in the Hague in 1899 and 1906, they applauded themselves for maintaining a century of peace since the end of the Napoleonic wars, yet in reality the nineteenth century was a century of the most widespread perpetration of direct as well as structural violence by western states against non-western peoples. Moral boundaries are also articulated authoritatively as a system of obligations and duties attaching to community membership. In this capacity, they also serve to legitimate the use of coercive power by agents of the community against members who violate the terms of obligations attaching to membership. This provides the rationale for a structural "monopoly" on legitimate uses of coercive power. Through the structure of law, the community articulates obligations and consequences for violating them. So long as one fulfills the obligations of citizenship, order is maintained and individuals are (in theory) secured against official uses of coercion against them. Violation of one's obligation, however, may invoke the legitimate use of coercion on behalf of preserving "law and order," and one convicted of violation thus becomes a legitimate target for collective coercion. Moral exclusion, for example, provides the justification for punishment of those members of society who break the law, even capital punishment.^(4) <#N_4_> In other words, membership in the community obligates us to refrain from using violence arbitrarily (self-defense is an exception and the burden is on the defendant to show that the use of violence conformed to the criteria according to which self-defensive violence is justified). But if an individual violates that obligation s/ he becomes an acceptable target for exclusion, and the community is "justified" in using violence against him. So moral communities are also the basis for legitimating the use of (good )violence as a mechanism of enforcement against (bad) violence -- violence in violation of the obligation of membership in the community. All of this makes the concept of moral boundaries a bit slippery, much more slippery at least than simply confining our discussion to units of moral and legal order delineated by the territorial boundaries of states. But it also makes it possible to interrogate the intersection between individual cognition and social order, or the agent-structure connection (Wendt 1994) . How does the individual perception that s/he is a member of a moral community lead to the legitimation of structures (states and state systems) in which individuals as agents of the structures construct and maintain boundaries within which norms of obligation and consequences for violating them are articulated? How, in particular, does this process apply to the problem of regulating violence through (1) obligations to refrain from violence in members' relationships with one another within a moral community, (2) the designation of certain categories of people as falling "outside" the boundaries of the community of obligation, (3) the legitimation of violence implemented on behalf of the community as a sanction against "internal" violations? Finally, how is the regulation of violence affected by the shifting of moral boundaries? For instance, within a state society, eliminating laws that legitimate exclusionary practices affecting women and "minorities" effectively alters the moral boundaries used to distribute justice. In "international relations," the community of "civilized nations" in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries referred exclusively to European and then European and settler states, and the moral dilemma with which las Casas and Vitorio struggled was how the morally unequal (as they understood it) relationship between Europeans and indigenous peoples ought to be structured. However, in the twentieth century, following decolonization, the term is used to include all states and to single out states claimed to be in violation of the terms of international civil order -- Germany and Iraq for aggression against other states, Germany and Japan for "crimes against humanity." Boundaries between communities of sameness and otherness become problematic when they legitimate certain political, economic, or social hierarchies and produce relationships of inclusion/exclusion. dominance/submission. and privilege/marginalization. The way in which sameness and otherness is constructed determines the distribution of political power, authority, and rights and, in cases of conflict, and who is "inside" and who is "outside" the boundaries of civic obligation. A state-centric model of world politics emphasizes boundaries conceived of as vertical--barriers separating people living in one territorial location from people living in other locations. Exclusive attention to such boundaries entails what John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge call "the territorial trap."^(5) <#N_5_> However, horizontal boundaries are equally, if not more, significant than vertical ones. Stratification based on class, race, non-state communality, and gender, for example, reflect some of the multiple identities that produce horizontal boundaries that produce violence. Ultimately, the way in which boundaries between "us" and "them" are defined and drawn is profoundly related to the way in which violence is legitimated. In feudal, pre-Westphalia Europe, the overlap among identity-based boundaries and, therefore, political communities meant the absence of a clear identity hierarchy to determine "us" from "them." Without that hierarchy, it was virtually impossible to distinguish legitimate and socially-sanctioned violence from illegitimate violence; that is, between war and crime. The Westphalia state as a social construction evolved within the historical context of shifting identities and boundaries that defined the moral community. The legitimacy of the emerging European states rested in great part on their capacity to manage violence by demarcating the boundaries of legitimate/illegitimate violence, and their ability to provide subjects/citizens with security, internal or external, where security is defined as the management of threats to civic order. Indeed, the Westphalia state provided a territorial basis to fix and enforce boundaries of identity so that the distinction between "inside" and "outside" became defensible. Even as the Westphalia state evolved, "European," as a geopolitical and cultural identity, also emerged as the basis for another level of moral community -- the community of "civilized nations," in the language of seventeenth century international law. Just as violence by European Christianity against Islam (and vice versa) was regarded as legitimate in the Middle Ages, so the violence used by Europeans against indigenous "pagans" in the New World and, thereafter, in Asia and Africa was seen as part of a mission to spread European "civilization" around the world. Violence to "civilize barbarians" was legitimate, and as imperialism spread, violence by European states against non-western peoples, though debated by international lawyers and theologians, generally fell beyond the scope of regulation through international norms, being reserved as a matter of domestic jurisdiction.^(6) <#N_6_> International legal discourse reflects one kind of moral boundary including (European) "civilized nations" and the regulation of violence in their relations through the laws of warfare (both in terms of the "just war" doctrine as well as the actual conduct of warfare). This same boundary functioned ultimately to exclude non-European peoples from any such protection.^(7) <#N_7_> The period during which the state arose as the pre-eminent form of political organization in Europe was also, perhaps not incidentally, the era during which Europeans were developing the technologies that would enable them to engage in unprecedented levels of collective violence (Cohen, Brown and Organski 1981). Specialized bureaucracies enabled Europe's territorial states, themselves independent legal entities distinguished from those who ruled them, to mobilize large populations for "interstate war" while at the same time pacifying the intrastate" arena. Prior to the emergence of the Westphalia state, both in medieval Europe as well as "the chaotic and roving warfare of the so-called wars of religion"^(8) <#N_8_> of the seventeenth century, it was almost impossible to demarcate internal and external wars. The amorphous nature of sovereign frontiers in recent decades similarly makes it difficult to distinguish between interstate and civil war, for example, in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Georgia or Zaire. Thus, we have come full circle. Our model of war in coming years will be less the Persian Gulf conflict that involved the uniformed armies of states moving across clearly demarcated boundaries than the conflict in the Great Lakes region of East Africa with its "bewildering number of combatants, all with slightly different agendas participating in a group of interconnected wars set in motion by the long-standing enmity between members of the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups."^(9) <#N_9_> Many of the wars of the post-cold war world uncannily resemble Martin Van Creveld's description of Europe's wars of the seventeenth-century and the Middle Ages. He says of the Thirty Years' War: "In all these struggles political, social, economic, and religious motives were hopelessly entangled." Mercenaries "robbed the countryside on their own behalf, even building fortified strongholds where they collected loot and held prisoners for ransom.." There was little distinction between soldiers and civilians, and "civilians suffered terrible atrocities." Of medieval Europe Van Creveld writes: "The population at large entered war mainly in the role of victims...[S]o little did feudal war concern itself with the protection of the population at large that the garrisons of besieged castles often expelled noncombatants, regarding them as so many useless mouths....The /bonhommes/ were regarded as scarcely human."^(10) <#N_10_> The trend in the twentieth century has been in the direction of increasing proportions of civilian deaths in war (Barnaby 1988), from five percent in World War I, and fifty percent in World War II, to 95% in the 1980s Lebanese Civil War. *Violence, War and the Westphalia State* Any definition of the Westphalia state must start with a reference to its monopoly of the means of coercion _within_ its frontiers. Legal positivists such as Austin in fact associate sovereignty with the capacity to command, backed by the threat of force.^(11) <#N_11_> For political theorists, the Hobbesian Leviathan, whatever other tasks it undertook, was imperative for keeping peace among its subjects. It was the anarchic nature of seventeenth-century English politics, after all, that inspired Hobbes's metaphor of the uncivilized state of nature as a "war of all against all," just as civil war in France had inspired Bodin to develop the idea of sovereignty a century earlier. "France in Bodin's time," declares J. L. Brierly, "had been rent by faction and civil war, and he was convinced that the cause of her miseries was the lack of a government strong enough to curb the subversive influences of feudal rivalries and religious intolerance, and that the best way to combat these evils was to strengthen the French monarchy."^(12) <#N_12_> Thus sovereignty, hallmark of the Westphalia state, by proclaiming the state as the final arbiter of legitimate violence, was itself constructed as a response to the perception of anarchic violence. One could make the argument that the return of anarchic violence in the form of terrorism, weapons proliferation, widespread human rights abuses, war crimes and communal genocide -- violence present institutions seem incapable of regulating effectively -- signals a failure of sovereignty, at least as it is currently constructed. War in Europe's Middle Ages resembled banditry or "private" warfare (in contrast to warfare between Europeans and outsiders) with members of the military caste of knights raiding one another's lands and creating permanent and general insecurity throughout Europe. As Adda Bozeman observes, there emerged a "localization of the concepts of war and peace" that "helped to reduce the total incidence of fighting that had disturbed the Western European world. Centralization of authority and the demarcation between crime and war accompanied a growing recognition of a distinction between inside and outside the state and the burgeoning state capacity relative to other political forms to mobilize resources and, therefore, to wage war. Centralized authority in Europe--whether in England under the Tudors, in France under Louis XI, or in Spain under Ferdinand and Charles V--was accompanied by the displacement of local identities by emerging national identities, evidenced in the spread of national languages, cultural practices, and bounded histories. National identities in turn provided the basis for legitimacy and, therefore, loyalty to the new states. Significantly, this was also an era of civil wars among nobles and religious factions with competing claims to authority. Thus, it was /through/ violence that the state was founded, and critical to its establishing was acquiring a monopoly over legitimate coercion (Cohen, Brown and Organski 1981). An equally important function of the state that was a logical consequence of exerting centralized authority within its frontiers and directing violence against others was its capacity to channel, limit, and, on occasion, routinize violence between itself and other sovereign states /beyond/ its frontiers. Brierly notes "that curious metamorphosis which transformed the doctrine of sovereignty from a principle of internal order, as Bodin and even Hobbes had conceived it, into one of international anarchy."^(13) <#N_13_> By the eighteenth century transborder violence in Europe was largely controlled by states, but its reach beyond Europe was less certain. State control of violence outside of Europe was a process not completed until the following century. Janice Thomson argues persuasively that Westphalia states achieved a monopoly over transborder violence relatively late in the game: "[L]ittle more than a century ago, the state did not monopolize the exercise of coercion beyond its borders....[T]he state, portrayed in theory as monopolizing coercion, is distinctively modern....This new state form...reflected a redrawing of authority claims such that authority over the use of violence was moved from the nonstate, economic, and international domains and placed in the state, political, and domestic realms of authority."^(14) <#N_14_> Thomson observes that the process was slow, that it accompanied the strengthening of state institutions in the nineteenth century and that, in fact, states were "reluctant to exert authority and control over nonstate violence."^(15) <#N_15_> They did so because it was necessary for overcoming some very specific problems "involving fundamental issues of authority" that arose in the course of Europe's outward colonial expansion. European state-building entailed the appropriation of inhabitants' loyalties and, consequently, identities, so that local forms of identity and community were supplanted by top-down processes and the articulation of "civic cultures," giving rise to nationalist ideology as a normative basis for legitimating the state. The boundaries of Westphalia states, internalized in the form of identities tied to territory and citizenship, gradually took precedence over, and in many cases erased, local boundaries delineated by religious and ethnic affiliation. Civic identity was accompanied by obligations of citizens/subjects to the state, as both Hobbes and Locke argued, and sought to assure that transborder violence must be authorized and organized by the state and the state alone. The articulation of moral boundaries was therefore occurring across two dimensions: within the state as civil society in which "internal" violence was regulated by the state, and across states in relations among sovereign rulers of European states as they articulated norms regulating interstate violence through "laws of war" as a feature of the "law of civilized nations," which was, as Vattel declared, "the law of sovereigns."^(16) <#N_16_> As the product of agreements among states, it is hardly surprising that international law or "the law of nations" legitimated the state monopoly on coercion and to codify customary limits on interstate war.^(17) <#N_17_> *Good Violence and Bad Violence* The solution to the unregulated violence that swept across Europe during the Thirty Years' War was to restrict war-making to conflicts between states and to "civilize" war with elaborate rules and mechanisms that defined "acceptable" behavior by soldiers and armies toward one another and toward civilians. "Princes were supposed to wage war," argues Van Creveld, "in such a way as to minimize the harm done both to their own soldiers, who deserved humane treatment if they happened to be captured or wounded, and to the civilian population."^(18) <#N_18_> In this way, war was rationalized in order to prevent the destructive savagery that characterized the religious strife of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In addition to the norms limiting war in Europe, limitations were also imposed by straitened taxing powers, weaponry, and logistics. In this way, the Westphalia state during its dynastic period succeeded in constraining violence both at home and abroad. The evolution of norms such as the balance of power, as well as those aimed at "civilizing" war as articulated in the Geneva and Hague conventions, aimed to shield states, their rulers, and their agents from the consequences of unrestrained violence. Balance-of-rhetoric makes clear the obligations that sovereign states were believed to owe one another. The Prussian civil servant Friedrich von Gentz spoke of balance of power as "that constitution subsisting among neighbouring states more or less connected with one another."^(19) <#N_19_> Rousseau saw the balance as the result of Europeans' "identity of religion, of moral standard, of international law."^(20) <#N_20_> Others echoed the same theme. As Janice Thomson concludes: "Institutions like neutrality and the balance of power constrained states to behave in particular ways toward other states but they also empowered them to expand their authority and control over even such powerful actors as the mercantile companies."^(21) <#N_21_> In effect, the Westphalia state struck a grand bargain with its male subjects. On the one hand, subjects would provide the state with resources necessary to fight wars, identify solely with the state, and let the state and its armies get on with things without civilian interference. On the other, the state would demand little of its subjects/citizens in wartime and protect them from the ravages of war. Thus, rulers preferred strategies "which in wartime interfered as little as possible with civilian life."^(22) <#N_22_> If civilians took up arms, as they did in Spain against Napoleon, they were viewed as criminals or, even worse, as rebels and could expect no mercy.Interstate norms limiting war and creating mutual obligations among states contrasted dramatically with the absence of limitations on violence between the surrogates of states--soldiers in the service of the sovereign--and substate or nonstate individuals or collectivities. Identities such as "Catholic" or "European" counted for more than common citizenship, and such identities produced boundaries among people that had little to do with the frontiers of states. The treatment of religious dissidents such as France's Albigensians, of indigenous tribal peoples such as North America's Indians and New Zealand's Maoris, or of substate "rebels" such as the Scottish clans that came out for Charles Stuart in 1745 were accorded few of the rights that the soldiers in national armies accorded one another. Since indigenous peoples, as Van Crevald observes, "did not know the state and its sharply-drawn division between government, army, and people," they "were automatically declared to be bandits."^(23) <#N_23_> Thus, the Spanish Conquistadors mercilessly exploited the Indians in the New World, looking upon them as uncivilized wards of Christian Spain and depicting them as little better than beasts. Only when missionaries and theologians like the Dominican Francisco de Vitoria, backed by the monarchy, declared that the indigenous people of the Americas had rights did their situation improve.^(24) <#N_24_> By the Laws of Burgos (1512) and the New Laws (1542), relations between Spain and the Indians were codified in a relationship marked by the moral superiority of Europeans and the moral inferiority of indigenous peoples. Ironically, although the twentieth century opened with the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1906 where delegates celebrated a "century of peace," believing war to have become both rare and "civilized," as the century progressed the actual conduct of war was marked by more widespread inhumanity and indiscriminate violence than ever. World Wars I and II saw the growing involvement and victimization of civilians in war whether as resistance fighters, war industrial workers, prisoners in concentration camps, or casualties in urban bombings. Despite efforts to maintain the fictitious distinction between combatants and noncombatants, technology and ideology conspired to erase it. The bargain originally struck by the Westphalia state with its citizens had begun to unravel. *Violence and the Erosion of State Authority * If the growth of state authority, linked to its monopoly on coercion and identity and consequent deepening of loyalty to the state, was aimed at achieving the limitation and rationalization of war as collective violence, so the erosion of state authority and the proliferation of other identities and legitimating ideologies has, not surprisingly, been accompanied by an erosion of restraints on violence and its decoupling from political purpose. As early as the French Revolution and the European wars that followed, the state's claim to monopolize violence at home and abroad and the distinction between inside and outside enshrined in sovereignty were challenged. Nationalism and its wedding to state sovereignty reinforced the vertical boundaries among peoples, reduced the flexibility of governing elites in foreign affairs, and by giving the state the only legitimate license to kill on behalf of its nationals, intensified dramatically the nature of warfare. The link between nationalism and statehood provided Nazi Germany with the rationalization for utilizing the coercive monopoly of the state, unrestrained in areas of "domestic jurisdiction," to first exclude and then brutalize and kill people within its own boundaries on the basis of their identity. To understand the link between declining state authority and revival of old identities and the proliferation of new ones requires a more critical consideration of how /power/ becomes /authoritative/ . As in the case of the nation-state, the link is through identity, and identity as sameness provides the legitimacy for moral community which in turn legitimates the regulation of behavior by members of the community. The Westphalia state was a product of social and political forces arising from the particular experience of European society. It was the state's ability to make claims on homogenizing national identities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that provided legitimacy for the state's claim to monopolize coercion, initially the sovereign's claim to the loyalty of his (as a father) children-subjects. Problematic international violence today can be thought of as falling roughly into five categories: (1) violence by the state, (2) violence between or among states, (3) violence among non-state actors, (4) anti-state violence, and (5) anti-(state) system violence. By taking into account the strength or weakness of norm-creating boundaries in the form of moral communities, we can better understand how and why some of these forms of violence are more and some less regulated under present conceptions of authority. We begin with an emerging moral community among European states, a community among sovereign equals subscribing to the basic norm of reciprocity. Violence by the state /within/ the state is relatively unregulated, with the exceptions noted below. It is (and the metaphor or analogy with a construction of the private/public distinction should be noted) a matter of "domestic jurisdiction." The "moral community of [European] states" agreed on the norm of non-intervention in one another's internal affairs. Both non-intervention and domestic jurisdiction are protected by the United Nations Charter. This reflects the assumption that states constituted boundaries of moral community internally, where citizens "contracted" as equals to construct legally binding rules of behavior on the basis of an internal norm of reciprocity. The state use of violence in relations with other states, however, has been the main subject of founding documents for both the League of Nations and the United Nations, as well as both customary and positive laws of warfare and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. A state and state system legitimated through identities presumed, for the purposes of constituting moral communities, to be homogeneous within the state, and "civilization" as the basis for a common political identity among (initially European or western) states succeeded to some degree in articulating norms regulating violence by states and in interstate relations, while violence among non-state actors and anti-state violence remained within the domestic sphere of jurisdiction. In the regulation of violence by states, a distinction was made between aggression and self-defense. And when a state engages in external violence -- and the only legitimate occasions for doing so now are acts of collective or individual self-defense or as part of a collective security enforcement action -- its use of violence is still limited by the rules of warfare. Following the Holocaust of the Second World War, some progress was made toward expanding the regulation of violence beyond norms pertaining to noncombatants and prisoners of war during a war to the general protection of individuals against abuses of state coercion through "universal" human rights. This very significant move for the first time extended the international regulation of violence into the shielded realm of state "domestic" jurisdiction -- the use of violence by states against those within their boundaries. In addition to designating acts of aggression as the "crime" of war, individual agents of states could be held accountable for "crimes against humanity" in the misuse of state coercive power. State monopoly over coercion was thus limited both by an obligation to refrain from aggression against other states as well as to refrain from using force to harm civilians. Because of the state-centric nature of the present system, the regulation of violence among non-state actors as well as anti-state violence by non-state actors remains in something of a grey area, normatively speaking. Anti-state violence in the form of civil war is an area in which normative agreement has long been elusive in international law (Arend and Beck 1993). No progress could be made during the Cold War either since U.S.-Soviet competition often took the form of one superpower or the other either "assisting" the state in securing itself against insurrection, or alternatively, supporting (assisting, intervening) on the side of anti-state actors. Recent research indicates that the main arena for anti-state war has shifted from the Global North to the Global South (Kane 1995). There is an area, however, in which anti-state and anti-(state) system violence converge -- terrorism. Like piracy during the nineteenth century, terrorism is viewed from the perspective of the state as a threat to the security of all states. Unlike piracy, terrorism today is primarily a political strategy used to strike at both individual states as well as the state system. The IRA, for example, is an example of anti-state terrorism, while most anti-U.S. terrorism represents a symbolic strike at the dominance of the U.S. and western states in determining outcomes and the distribution of power in the state system. The proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction also represents a kind of anti-system violence or threat, aimed, like some forms of terrorism, at challenging the systemic status quo. Finally, violence in the twentieth century has become problematic when it occurs in a "stateless" space; a space where no clearly defined, recognized or effective authority (states, extensions of states such as imperial power, or alliances of states) operates. This was the case in the Balkans as the breakdown of imperial authority left boundaries contestable and ultimately led to World War I, in many anti-colonial wars, in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union and postwar Yugoslavia, and in postcolonial settings where the boundaries of identity render political spaces highly contestable. More recently, the erosion of state authority has accelerated changes in the nature of political violence. James Rosenau argues that we are confronted by "global changes that may amount to a _world crisis of authority_,"^(25) <#N_25_> and he blames the "static conception of authority structures, both within and between societies" which "treated the world as frozen into a structure comprised of nation-states"^(26) <#N_26_> for the absence of theoretical progress in the field of international relations. In his view, the breakdown of authority in nation-states is one of several factors that have fundamentally altered the nature of global politics. In consequence, "the worldwide crisis of authority can be viewed as having so thoroughly undermined the prevailing distribution of global power as to alter the significance of the State as a causal agent in the course of events." He adds: "With the advent of more analytically skillful publics and the surge in subgroupism, it becomes increasingly difficult to perceive power as distributed primarily among States. Indeed, for those who see the crisis of authority as deep-seated and enduring, it no longer seems compelling to refer to the world as a State system."^(27) <#N_27_> While the link between identity and political authority in non-western states, notably in China and Japan, predates the rise of the west as the core of a global moral community, it is the European model and the assumptions underlying it that has become the norm for global political organization today . For the vast majority of non-European states today, particularly postcolonial states, the consolidation of identity and the assertion of centralized authority did not precede the construction of durable political boundaries. Those "late" states, with sovereign boundaries determined by external forces, are increasingly characterized by civil and transnational warfare among factions making competing claims to rule based on incompatible identities and challenging existing political boundaries. In other words, the problem of ethnic conflict is really a problem of shifting identity boundaries in a system created by Europeans to reinforce territorial claims. In many of these states, ruling elites are viewed as representing and perpetuating the privileges of a tribal, family, religious, or regional faction rather than as surrogates for unifying national identity. Under these conditions, elite claims to monopolize coercive force are unpersuasive, and the distinction between the "official" or authoritative armed forces of the state and other armed groups breaks down. The erosion of state authority, as Rosenau argues, heralds the emergence of new authority structures and the growing importance of other forms of "governance" besides that of "sovereignty-bound" actors. Global politics, including global violence, as was the case in earlier epochs, involves an extensive cast of "sovereignty-free actors"--"multinational corporations, ethnic groups, bureaucratic agencies, political parties, subnational governments, transnational societies, international organizations, and a host of other types of collectivities."^(28) <#N_28_> No longer is the Westphalia state system the only game in town, and it probably never was. *If So, Then What?* As states are enfeebled, non-territorial identities grow in importance, and the distinction between inside and outside erodes, what are the options for developing more effective strategies for the management of global violence? We suggest three possibilities, all of which assume a truncated state; there may be more. The first entails a restructuring of the state, most likely according to a model of neoclassical liberalism; the second is restructuring the global system and providing a greater role for nonstate and interstate institutions; and the last, escalating chaos through the incapacity of the present system to manage a proliferation of problematic violence in areas falling beyond the scope of state authority as it is presently constructed. In reality, the world may feature elements of some or all of these, with different regions reflecting more of one or the other. Both of the first two, however, require some kind of rectification of the boundaries of moral community within the state with those of the state system, which will entail a reconceptualization of state sovereignty and a struggle for the inclusion of non-western perspectives in the construction of new forms of authority and world order. With the first possibility, the link between the state and identity is weakened, and the state assumes a purely utilitarian role, a kind of institutionalized referee impartially enforcing the rules of the game. The state defines jurisdictional boundaries that are significant mainly for trying to manage economic markets and assure equality of opportunity for citizens. Indicative of this possibility are the shift from national to civic culture in the Western liberal tradition and the growing emphasis in Western political life to regard politics mainly in terms of allocating resources according to consensual values. One might conceive this tendency less as a change in the state itself than as a movement from state sovereignty to market sovereignty or the hegemony of "transnational liberalism."^(29) <#N_29_> What it "means" to be American, or Canadian, or French, or Chinese is less important than that individuals are entitled to more or less equal life chances, which the state (aided by the market) is bound to establish and protect, coupled with majoritarian democracy and minority rights. In this scenario, Westphalian states will evolve in a direction akin to that followed by the states within the United States: They were once meaningful expressions of local identity, but increased economic integration and mobility across state lines relegated them, eventually, to the role of managing the distribution of local resources. Under these conditions, the Westphalia state would have the limited role of managing the distribution of access to economic and educational resources within an environment of equal opportunity and so would distribute public goods according to the rules of majoritarian democratic discourse while protecting the right of dissent. Since allocating resources presumes consensus or agreement over values, this version of the limited state requires an informed citizenry with access to multiple channels of political discourse and a pluralistic constellation of mediating associations. Arguably the OECD countries already reflect much of this liberal model. For neoliberals, war is a waste of resources that disrupts the market; theirs is the world of Norman Angell more than eight decades later. Where the threat of violence remains high--such as in Northern Ireland or America's urban centers--the causes can be traced to the extent to which these societies have failed to satisfy the requirements of the liberal model.^(30) <#N_30_> In the case of race relations in the United States, minorities perceive that the state does not provide equal life chances. In Northern Ireland, citizens do not agree that participatory rules are fair and equal. More importantly, the Irish case points to a serious problem with the liberal model, its failure to take account of the persistence of identity as the basis for transforming power into political authority. As a result, it cannot cope effectively either with the integrating forces of globalism or the fragmenting impact of subnational and transnational identities. Thus, Michael Sandel deplores the disappearance of civic virtue in defining citizenship: The growing aspiration for the public expression of communal identities reflects a yearning for political arrangements that can situate people in a world increasingly governed by vast and distant forces. For a time the nation-state promised to answer this yearning, to provide the link between identity and self-rule....The nation-state laid claim to the allegiance of its citizens on the ground that its exercise of sovereignty expressed their collective identity. In the contemporary world, however, this claim is losing its force....As their effective sovereignty fades, nations gradually lose their hold on the allegiance of their citizens.^(31) <#N_31_> If citizens perceive that the rules allow for fair and equal chances to influence the allocation process, the threat of civil violence will be reduced. However, the problem of external and transnational violence remains. The prospect that the liberal state can manage external violence lies in the Kantian hope that all states can be simultaneously restructured along liberal lines. Research on the incidence of wars between democracies and nondemocracies and between states with market and non-market economies is not reassuring.^(32) <#N_32_> In sum, the liberal solution is, at best, a very long-term one and makes the dubious assumption that individuals will abandon subnational and transnational identities in favor of republican citizenship. The model also makes the unlikely assumption that the liberal state can or will accommodate identity groups for whom there exist irreconcilable differences regarding the values that underlie resource allocation. A second possibility involves efforts to modify the interstate system along the lines suggested by former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali or Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans as discussed in "Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond."^(33) <#N_33_> In this model intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations and its agencies, along with regional regimes or even former colonial powers, take on an active interventionist role in restoring peace, promoting reconciliation in post-conflict environments, and reconstructing state institutions.^(34) <#N_34_> Here, the state, or rather the particular states in which such intervention takes place, is also restructured, but the impetus for restructuring arises from the interstate system, from the norms and institutions of interstate and transnational collaboration. United Nations involvement in Somalia, Bosnia, and especially Cambodia, in cooperation with a variety of nongovernmental groups, illustrates what we mean here, as to some extent does IMF conditionality. The second model is in some ways a variation on the first, with intervention legitimated by international norms compelling states to construct majoritarian institutions, protect minority rights, and take responsibility for establishing rules of distributional fairness.^(35) <#N_35_> It assumes that the norms which already exist for the management of external violence in the form of _jus in bello_ and _jus contra bellum_^(36) <#N_36_> are still in force. Because sovereignty precludes legal interference in domestic politics, the norms regarding international responses to civil wars are much less developed than those pertaining to interstate war, offering little more than guidelines for the variety of repertoires available to the international community in relation to influencing civil-war outcomes or remaining neutral. Norms regarding the right of a state to request assistance from other states to secure itself against attack or to pursue a strategy of collective self-defense (and therefore the legitimate use of force with the assistance of third parties) have left civil wars a gray area of international law. This was apparent in the early stages of conflict in the former Yugoslavia. There would be a need to articulate reasonably consistent norms that would lead either to the development of guidelines in determining appropriate actions for outsiders in civil wars. It is not only the absence of institutional authority and enforcement capacity that make it difficult to realize this model. More serious obstacles are the absence of political will among states to allow non-Westphalian institutions to act authoritatively to manage the use of force during interstate, transtate, or civil violence and the implication that somehow citizens are not capable of self-government. Neither human-rights norms nor the laws of war have been subjects of enforcement, with the exception of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals after World War II, and, some half century later, the ineffective efforts to bring war criminals to justice in Bosnia and Rwanda. Indeed, all legal regulation relies on the existence of sufficient political will to enforce norms and support institutional development to this end. A variant of the second model involves providing a greater role for nongovernmental organizations in efforts to manage violence. Already a variety of NGOs like Doctors Without Borders provide humanitarian relief for and protect civilian victims of civil violence. One proposal to reform the U.N. Trusteeship Council as a Forum for Indigenous Peoples would make available to the nongovernmental representatives of such peoples a forum to discuss their status and seek redress for their grievances against states without violence.^(37) <#N_37_> Proposals such as this aim to increase NGO participation as a way to prevent conflict or reduce its consequences. Another way in which NGOs can be involved is by utilizing the strategies of conflict management and resolution being developed in academic settings.^(38) <#N_38_> A final possibility is an extended period of almost-unimaginable chaos that will raise popular anxiety and encourage authoritarian "solutions" of the sort imposed in Uruguay and Argentina in the 1970s. As states are forced share authority with or surrender it to other collectivities, what will the world look like? Kaplan describes "the last map" in apocalyptic terms: Imagine cartography in three dimensions, as if in a hologram. In this hologram would be the overlapping sediments of group and other identities atop the merely two-dimensional color markings of city-states and the remaining nations, themselves confused in places by shadowy tentacles, hovering overhead, indicating the power of drug cartels, mafias, and private security agencies. Instead of borders, there would be moving "centers" of power, as in the Middle Ages. Many of these layers would be in motion..... Henceforward the map of the world will never be static. This future map--in a sense, the "Last Map"--will be an ever-mutating representation of chaos.^(39) <#N_39_> These by no means exhaust the possible futures, and they are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, there is evidence of all three in contemporary global politics. It is time to look with fresh eyes at the social changes that underlie contemporary global violence and the piecemeal, sometimes experimental, efforts to manage it. It makes little sense to continue debating whether or not sovereignty is eroding, as if this were a discoverable truth, but instead to acknowledge that Westphalia states are less and less able to accomplish the most basic task for which they were designed--conflict management. This shifts the discussion from a purely theoretical plane to a more practical realm, thereby linking the abstract question of "what is happening to the state?" to the investigation of policies and institutions to cope more effectively with new forms of global violence. *Conclusion* The erosion of state authority evidenced by, among other things, the inability of the state and the state system to regulate violence in Europe during the first half of the century and elsewhere in recent decades, and the revival or intensification of identities that compete with state citizenship are at least partly responsible for the increasing frequency of warfare that bears little resemblance to the Clausewitzian ideal. Nevertheless, contemporary analyses of warfare and violence continues to focus separately on interstate war and civil violence, failing to recognize that in many instances they have merged. Unlike wars among Europe's Westphalia states, violence today is subject to few limitations, is more often than not initiated by groups other than states, does not distinguish between soldier and citizen, lacks definable political objectives and merges with crime, and is organized in nonterritorial ways. Such warfare mirrors Europe's Middle Ages when armored knights and petty lords made war on each other whenever they wished to enrich themselves. Overwhelmed by virulent ethnic and tribal jealousies and violent memories, as well as poverty and environmental disaster, the fabric of many states is unraveling. And, as Van Crevald declares: "Once the legal monopoly of armed force, long claimed by the state, is wrested out of its hands, existing distinctions between war and crime will break down much as is already the case today in places such as Lebanon, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Peru, or Colombia."^(40) <#N_40_> Events from Bosnia to Zaire recall Hugo Grotius's description of seventeenth-century Europe. Compare the passage written by Grotius during the birth pains of the Westphalian state system in the introduction to his 1625 treatise, _The Law of War and Peace_, with Stanley Hoffmann's description of global politics written at the twilight of that system: Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to war, such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of; I observed that men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all, and that when arms have once been taken up there is no longer any respect for law, divine or human; it is as if...frenzy had openly been let loose for the committing of all crimes.^(41) <#N_41_> How states create and maintain order in a world of sovereign powers has been the fundamental and so far insoluble problem of international relations....[W]orld politics, and therefore world order, are no longer monopolized by states....On the other hand, the various peoples of the world, as opposed to governments, are more turbulent than ever before.^(42) <#N_42_> *Endnotes* 1. Taking into account the problem with "anthropomorphizing" the state, what we are really suggesting is that those acting on behalf of the state do so within a normative framework constructed historically through diplomatic and international discourses. Thus the statement " the articulation and application of norms among actors follows from their normative agreement" refers to individuals acting on behalf of the state within a dynamic and ongoing normative discourse. 2. We do not deny that "good" violence may also be violence that serves the interests of dominant actors , and "bad" violence that which obstructs their interests, but when these are translated into normative terms, and particularly when norms are codified as regulation or law, they are constructed qualitatively. 3. Karl Deutsch called this a "pluralistic security community." In such a community, widespread and frequent communication and interaction facilitate the exchange of information and expand the pool of common tastes, memories and perceptions. Elites empathize with each other and are sensitive to one another's needs and therefore minimize misperception and conflict. Deutsch, et.al., _Political Community and the North Atlantic Area_ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 4. This does not mean that we agree with the logic pertaining to capital punishment, but that moral exclusion accounts for the way, for instance, spectators and supporters of capital punishment find satisfaction in killing a member of their own society. 5. John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, _Mastering Space: Hegemony, territory and international political economy_ (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 79. 6. Though the Westphalian state is our topic here, we do not deny that similar boundaries between inside and outside occurred in other cultural-historical contexts. The culturally-based boundary between Europeans and non-Europeans, for example, was similar to the cultural divide described by the Chinese when they described those beyond the reach of the Middle Kingdom as barbarians. 7. In fact, the debate among lawyers and theologians eventually came to rest on the notion that a war conducted in order to Christianize a pagan people constituted a just war (Anaya 1997). 8. R.R. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War," in Peter Paret, ed., _Makers of Modern Strategy_ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 94. 9.James C. McKinley, Jr., "African Firestorm," _New York Times_, October 28, 1996, p. A6. 10.Martin Van Creveld, _The Transformation of War_ (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 50, 51. See also Martin Van Creveld, "The Fate of the State," _Parameters_ (Spring 1996), pp. 4-17. 11. Jeffrie Murphy and Jules Coleman, _The Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence_ (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), pp. 22-23. 12. J. L. Brierly, _The Law of Nations_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 5th ed., p. 8. 13. Brierly, _The Law of Nations_, p. 45. 14. Thomson, _Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns_, p. 11. 15. Ibid., p. 143. 16. Emmerich de Vattel, "Preface" to _The Law of _Nations, in M. G. Forsyth, H. M. A. Keens-Soper, P. Savigear, eds., _The Theory of International Relations: Selected Texts from Gentili to Treitschke_ (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), p. 100. 17. The 1933 Montevideo Conference, as well as the Buenos Airs (1936) and Lima (1938) Conferences lay out the rights and duties of states, including the states right to exist and therefore defend themselves against both internal and external foes. 18. Van Creveld, _The Transformation of War_, p. 37. 19. Cited in Forsyth, Keens-Soper, Savigear, eds., _The Theory of International Relations_, p. 281. 20. Cited in ibid., p. 133. 21. Thomson, _Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns_, p. 150. 22. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War," p. 92. 23. Van Crevald, _The Transformation of War_, p. 41. In many respects, the state regarded women as it did indigenous peoples. The state characterized both as "children" or "wards" whose domination was necessary to their "moral development" The founding of the Westphalia state maintained patriarchy as an authoritative structure for both public and private social order. For these reasons, we should not be surprised that violence against women and children was not the subject of institutional regulation until recently, and even now these restraints are erratically enforced. 24. Vitoria argued that under natural law the Indians were free people and had owned their land before the Spaniards arrived. Gerhard von Glahn, _Law Among Nations_, 7th ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996), pp. 25-26. 25. James N. Rosenau, "A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics in an Era of Cascading Interdependence," _International Studies Quarterly _28:3 (September 1984), p. 246. Emphasis in original. 26. Ibid., p. 251. 27. Ibid., p. 263-264. 28. Rosenau, _Turbulence in World Politics_, p. 36. 29. Agnew and Corbridge, _Mastering Space_, pp. 164-207. 30. The case may be made that racial conflict reflects the problem that certain identities generate fundamentally different values regarding resource allocation. Majoritarian rule cannot satisfy resulting grievances. This is the case in conflicts between settler and indigenous peoples. See Wilmer (1993). 31. Michael J. Sandel, "Americas" Search for a New Public Philosophy" _The Atlantic Monthly_, March 1996, p. 74. 32. Etel Solingen, "Domestic Legitimacy and International Cooperation" paper presented at the International Studies Association (Acapulco, Mexico: March 1993). 33. Gareth Evans, _Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond_ (St. Leonard, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1993) In this book Evans picks up on suggestions made by Boutros-Ghali in his report "An Agenda for Peace." 34. Recognizing that the distinction between domestic and international politics has broken down to the point where Article 2, paragraph 7 of the U.N. Charter must be ignored, Helman and Ratner advocate what they call a U.N. "conservatorship" in the case of failed states. "Saving Failed States," p. 12. William Pfaff advances the even more controversial idea of "disinterested neo-colonialism" in the case of Africa. "A New Colonialism?" _Foreign Affairs_ 74:1 (January/February 1995), pp. 2-6. 35. To some extent these are the aims of the two U.N.'s International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 36. Laws during war, laws going into war, and laws against war. 37. For a variation of this proposal, see Mark Nerfin, "The Future of the United Nations System: Some Questions on the Occasion of an Anniversary" in Richard A. Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, _The United Nations and a Just World Order_ (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991). 38. See Birkhoff, Mitchell, and Schirch, _Annotated Bibliography of Conflict Analysis and Resolution_ (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 1995). 39. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," p. 75. 40. Van Creveld, _The Transformation of War_, p. 204. 41. Hugo Grotius, _Prolegomena to the Law of War and Peace_ (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), p. 21. 42. Stanley Hoffmann, ̉Delusions of World Order, _New York Review of Books_, April 9, 1992, p. 37.